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Comments
AN OPEN DEBATE ON UNITED STATES CITIZENS
DESIGNATED AS ENEMY COMBATANTS: WHERE DO
WE GO FROM HERE?
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 have required our
courts, and more importantly our nation, to balance the need for na-
tional security against the protection of individual constitutional
rights. One consideration is whether the executive branch, namely
the President, has the authority to hold a United States citizen, who
has been labeled an enemy combatant, indefinitely without charges or
access to counsel.' The Bush Administration has taken the position
that an enemy combatant, regardless of citizenship status, does not
have the right to counsel and, in particular, unmonitored access to
counsel.2 An opposing view is that even though the President has the
ability to determine enemy combatant status, the power to detain
United States citizens without charges or procedural protections raises
serious concerns and implications for individual rights and liberties.'
This controversial issue is being debated in federal courts of appeals
and district courts throughout the United States.4 The debate centers
around the various ways in which the executive and judicial branches
have dealt with recent enemy combatants, in particular, John Walker
Lindh, Yaser Esam Hamdi, and Jose Padilla. This Comment presents
an open dialogue that analyzes the various ways the courts have han-
dled the adjudication of a United States citizen captured during times
of national conflict and the protections that should be afforded to
1. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 281-82 (4th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Hamdi II]
and in Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 588-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), the initial
step in the courts' analyses centered on the President's authority to determine enemy com-
batant status. The authors of this Comment do not dispute the President's authority to
determine such status. The focus of this Comment is to debate the protections that should
be afforded to a United States citizen once labeled an enemy combatant.
2. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 282; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
3. Hamdi I, 296 F.3d at 282.
4. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Hamdi III]
(holding that the President may lawfully designate a United States citizen who is "captured
in a zone of active combat in a foreign theater of conflict" as an enemy combatant, and
giving deference to the President's decision to designate a United States citizen as an un-
lawful enemy combatant); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 558 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(denying lawful enemy combatant status to a United States citizen); Padilla, 233 F. Supp.
2d at 599 (granting access to counsel to a United States citizen labeled an enemy combat-
ant for the purpose of pursuing a habeas petition).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
those captured and labeled enemy combatants. After summarizing
the relevant law in the area, this Comment will first present arguments
in favor of detaining enemy combatants without affording them the
right to counsel. 5 Thereafter, the counterpoint will be presented, ar-
guing that a United States citizen designated as an enemy combatant
cannot be detained indefinitely by the executive branch without rec-
ognizing inherent constitutional rights and safeguards, such as the ac-
cess to counsel.6
I. BACKGROUND
7
The Supreme Court has rarely spoken on issues affecting national
security during times of war or national emergency. However, on a
few occasions, the Court has considered certain controversial issues,
the resolution of which have shaped the current national security
landscape. On one such occasion, the Supreme Court set forth the
basic principle that the President, as Commander-in-Chief in charge
of military affairs, is to be given great deference to determine enemy
status of those who take up arms against the United States.' In addi-
tion, the Court has struggled with the evolving issue of what protec-
tions should be afforded to an individual classified as an enemy
combatant. The Court's analysis in these cases has focused on
whether the individual was a United States citizen or a foreign na-
tional.9 The Court has also addressed whether a military commission
or a civilian court is the appropriate forum to try an enemy combat-
ant."' Despite considering these peripheral issues, the Court, until
now, has not faced the specific question of whether a United States
citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant can be held indefinitely
without charges or access to counsel.
A. Presidential Authority to Name Enemy Status
The Supreme Court first considered the President's authority to
name enemy status in The Prize Cases." These cases presented the is-
sue of whether cargo vessels captured during the Civil War could be
5. See discussion infra Part II.A.
6. See discussion infra Part II.B.
7. The legal background represents relevant case law and legislative developments
current as of July 2003.
8. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 670 (1862). During the Civil War, the Court held that
the President alone had the authority to classify southern confederates as enemy belliger-
ents, and the Court must defer to such designations. Id.
9. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20 (1942).
10. Id. at 24.
11. 67 U.S. 635 (1862).
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brought in as prizes by public ships to the United States. 12 A determi-
nation of enemy status was important because the Court had reasoned
that enemy ships could permissibly be captured, but traitor ships
could not. 3 Thus, the Court had to first decide whether southern
confederates should be considered enemies or traitors.' 4 The Court
held that the President, acting as Commander-in-Chief, has the sole
authority to decide whether the resistance by southern confederates
was of such alarming proportions as to allow them to be declared en-
emy belligerents.15 According to the Court, this question of enemy
status was to be decided by the President alone and the courts are
bound by the decisions of the executive branch in these matters.'
6
From this premise, the Court upheld the President's decision that the
southern ships belonged to enemy belligerents and were, therefore,
permissible to be captured as prizes.' 7
B. Detention of Enemy Belligerents
In addition to the question of Presidential authority to name en-
emy combatants, the Supreme Court has also considered several issues
stemming from the detention of enemy belligerents. Cases arising
during the Civil War and World War II addressed the difference be-
tween a United States citizen held as an enemy combatant and a for-
eign national held as an enemy combatant.' 8 In the cases involving
United States citizens, the government has responded either through
12. Id. at 674-82. In cases of war with recognized foreign powers, the Court set forth
the established principle that the capture and seizure of enemy ships is an appropriate
coercing power. Id. at 651. However, the novel issue presented in this case was whether
this same practice could occur against a nation in civil uprising. Id. at 670.
13. See id. at 670 (recognizing the difference between enemies in war and traitors in an
insurrection).
14. Id.
15. Id. The debate surrounding this issue was whether the uprising should be consid-
ered a war or merely an insurrection. Id. If the uprising was considered a war then the
southern confederates would be considered enemy belligerents and could be captured. Id.
Reciprocally, if it was an insurrection the confederates would be considered traitors and
could not be captured. Id.
16. Id. The proposition that the President has the authority to name enemy status has
been upheld in subsequent cases. See Ex pane Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942); Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 314 (1946); Hamdi II, 296 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2002); Camp-
bell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 589
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
17. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 674. The Court stated that "[a]ll persons residing within
this territory whose property may be used to increase the revenues of the hostile power, are
in this contest, liable to be treated as enemies, though not foreigners." Id. The Court
applied this rationale individually to each of the four captured ships. Id at 674-682.
18. See Ex pate Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); Ex pante Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, (1942); In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
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the judicial process by way of Article III courts or through the military
powers of the Executive.' 9 In contrast, the government has only em-
ployed the use of military tribunals when confronted with a foreign
national labeled an enemy combatant.20 Regardless, these cases form
the basis for evaluating enemy combatant protections and procedures.
1. Detention of United States Citizens.-
a. Ex parte Milligan & Ex parte Quirin.-In Ex parte Milli-
gan,2' a Civil War-era case, the Supreme Court considered whether a
military tribunal could try a United States citizen. 22 Lamdin P. Milli-
gan was charged with plotting to seize arsenals and to liberate prison-
ers of war.2 3 Sixteen days after his arrest, Milligan was tried by a
military commission and sentenced to hang.
2 4
On a petition for writ of habeas corpus,2 5 Milligan argued that
the military commission did not have jurisdiction to try him because
he was a United States citizen. 26 The Supreme Court agreed, stating
that "[a] 11 other persons, citizens of states where the courts are open, if
charged with [a] crime, are guaranteed the inestimable privilege of
trial by jury," and that "It] his privilege is a vital principle, underlying
the whole administration of criminal justice .... ,,27 The Supreme
Court specifically noted that Milligan was not a prisoner of war and,
therefore, any illegal acts that he committed were punishable only in
the courts of Indiana.
28
19. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, (1942); In re
Territo, 156 F.2d 142 (1946). In these cases, the United States citizens were seized both on
United States soil and in foreign territory.
20. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 6; Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18-19.
21. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
22. Id. at 108. Milligan, a citizen of Indiana for twenty years, had never served in the
armed forces of the United States. Id. at 107-08. Furthermore, Indiana was not a state in
rebellion during Milligan's arrest and trial. Id. at 108.
23. Id. at 6-7.
24. Id. at 107.
25. The writ of habeas corpus allows judicial review of the legality of a person's arrest
or detention. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
26. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 108. The Court indicated that a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus was the proper method to challenge an alleged unlawful detention, as was claimed
here. Id. at 113 (citation omitted).
27. Id. at 123 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court drew a distinction between mem-
bers of the United States armed forces, who were subject to trial by a military commission,
and United States citizens. Id.
28. Id. at 131. The Government contended that Milligan was a prisoner of war. Id. at
131, 134. The Court, however, noted that it could not "see how [Milligan could] be
treated as a prisoner of war, when he lived in Indiana for the past twenty years, was arrested
there, and had not been, during the late troubles, a resident of any of the states in rebel-
lion." Id. at 131.
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The issue of trying a United States citizen before a military com-
mission arose again during World War II. In Ex parte Quirin,29 the
Supreme Court recognized that the government can detain a United
States citizen as an enemy belligerent and try him in a military tribu-
nal.3" In Quirin, several military detainees filed petitions for writs of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia and were denied.31 The detainees then filed petitions for
certiorari in the Supreme Court to review the district court's ruling.32
The question raised was whether a United States citizen, who entered
the country to conduct sabotage at the direction of a foreign govern-
ment, could be tried by a military commission appointed by the Presi-
dent.33 Petitioner Haupt, one of several saboteurs, argued that he was
a United States citizen because he came to the United States when he
was five years old and had obtained citizenship when his parents were
naturalized during his minority.34 The Government argued that
Haupt had renounced or abandoned his citizenship through his ac-
tions.35 Ultimately, however, the Court did not find it necessary to
resolve the citizenship issue. 36 The Court indicated that citizenship in
the United States does not grant an enemy belligerent any special
rights.37 Therefore, Haupt's citizenship was irrelevant to the Court's
decision in this case.3
Because the saboteurs were captured on American soil and not in
uniform, the Court discussed the distinction between a lawful enemy
combatant and an unlawful enemy combatant. 39 The Court explained
that a lawful enemy combatant is a soldier captured on a battlefield by
opposing military forces.4 Lawful enemy combatants are subject to
29. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
30. Id. at 37-38, 44. The Court noted that military tribunals can be convened by the
President, or other competent military authorities, to try persons charged with violations of
the law of war. Id. at 26-27. In addition, the President can prescribe the regulations for the
procedure of the trial as well as the procedures for the review of the record and any judg-
ment or sentence. Id. at 22.
31. Id. at 18.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 18-19. Haupt received training and payments from the German government
to conduct acts of sabotage in the United States. Id. at 21. Specifically, Haupt came ashore
from a German submarine carrying "explosives, fuses, and incendiary and timing devices."
Id.
34. Id. at 20.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 37-38.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 30-31.
40. Id. at 31.
979
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capture and detention as prisoners of war.4' On the other hand, the
Court indicated that unlawful enemy combatants are combatants who
pass behind enemy lines in civilian attire for the purpose of waging
war by destruction of life or property.42 Unlawful enemy combatants
are subject to capture and punishment by military tribunals for the
acts that render them unlawful enemy combatants." In addressing
Haupt's citizenship argument, the Court stated that "[c] itizenship in
the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from
the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because [sic] in
violation of the law of war."44
The Court also addressed the detainees' argument that they were
entitled to the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.4" The Court stated that the protections
offered by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, namely trial by jury and
presentment by a grand jury, were familiar elements of criminal pro-
cedure when the Constitution was adopted.46 These protections were
not, however, known to military tribunals which are not considered
courts "in the sense of the Judiciary Article."47 The Court then reiter-
ated that the purpose of section 2 of Article III, the Judiciary Article,
was not to enlarge the then existing right to ajury trial.48 The Court
stated that:
All these are instances of offenses committed against the
United States, for which a penalty is imposed, but they are
not deemed to be within Article III, § 2 or the provisions of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments relating to 'crimes' and
'criminal prosecutions.'49 In the light of this long-continued
and consistent interpretation we must conclude that § 2 of
Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments cannot be
taken to have extended the right to demand ajury to trials by
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 37.
45. Id. at 38-39. The Fifth Amendment requires presentment or indictment of a grand
jury for capital or infamous crimes. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Sixth Amendment grants
the right to a jury trial in criminal cases. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
46. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39.
47. Id. (citation omitted).
48. Id.
49. The Court was discussing the fact that petty offenses could be tried without ajury in
the federal courts despite the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because the petty offenses were
originally triable at common law without ajury. Id. at 40 (citation omitted). In addition,
the Court noted that "an action for debt to enforce a penalty inflicted by Congress was not
subject to the constitutional restrictions upon criminal prosecutions." Id. (citation
omitted).
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military commission, or to have required that offenses
against the law of war not triable by jury at common law be
tried only in civil courts.5"
The Court, thus, made clear that the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments applied to criminal trials as they were known at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution. 1 The Court did not believe that Con-
gress had intended to extend Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections
to alien or citizen offenders who violated the law of war, which was
triable by a military tribunal.52
The detainees, in particular Haupt, pointed out that the Court in
Milligan had previously held that the law of war could "'never be ap-
plied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the gov-
ernment, and where the courts are open and their process
unobstructed."' 53 However, the Court distinguished Milligan based
on its unique facts and rejected this argument.54 Instead, the Court
affirmed the district court's ruling and denied the detainees leave to
file petitions for habeas corpus in the Supreme Court.
55
b. In re Territo & Duncan v. Kahanamoku.-Another
World War II era case, In re Territo,56 concerned a United States citizen
who was fighting as a solider for the Italian Army and captured by the
United States on the battlefield in Italy.57 Gaetano Territo was then
held as a prisoner of war (POW) in the United States.58 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was presented with the
issue of whether Territo could be detained as a POW.59 The court
reasoned that anyone who actively opposed an army in war could be
captured and held as a prisoner of war, with the exception of spies
and non-uniformed fighters who were not afforded such status.6"
50. Id.
51. Id. at 39.
52. Id. at 44. The Court was referring to the fact that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
by construction, were exempt in cases "arising in the land [or naval] forces." Id. at 41. The
Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capi-
tal, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service
in time of War or public danger." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
53. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45 (citing ExpaneMilligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121 (1866)).
54. Id.; see supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
analysis of MUlligan).
55. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48.
56. 156 F.2d 142 (1946).
57. Id. at 142-43.
58. Id. at 143.
59. Id. at 142.
60. Id. at 145.
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Therefore, the court concluded that Territo was properly held as a
POW and his restraint was lawful for the duration of the war.6 '
In addition, the Supreme Court has considered whether a United
States citizen could be tried in a military tribunal when he is not la-
beled as an enemy combatant. In Duncan v. Kahanamoku,6 2 the Gover-
nor of Hawaii, pursuant to the Hawaiian Organic Act,63 suspended the
writ of habeas corpus6 4 and placed the territory under martial law be-
cause of the deadly attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.65 In accordance
with the Act, the Commanding General established military tribunals
to replace the courts. 66 The two petitioners in the case, White and
Duncan, were civilians respectively charged and convicted of stock
embezzling and assault in a military tribunal. 67 The issue presented to
the Supreme Court was whether the military tribunal had the author-
ity to try these civilians.68 The Court held that martial law was not to
authorize the supplanting of courts by military tribunals because Con-
gress did not intend the Hawaiian Organic Act to exceed the bounda-
ries between military and civilian power.69 Therefore, the petitioners
were ordered to be released from custody.
7 0
61. Id. at 146-48.
62. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
63. Section 67 of the Hawaiian Organic Act, 31 Stat. 141, 48 U.S.C.A. section 532 states,
"the governor ... may, in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger ... when
public safety requires it, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the
Territory ... under martial law .... Duncan, 327 U.S. at 307 n.I.
64. The writ of habeas corpus can be suspended during times of national emergency.
Duncan, 327 U.S. at 307-08.
65. Id. at 307.
66. Id. at 308. These military tribunals had the authority to try civilians charged with
violating the law. Id. at 309.
67. Id. at 309-10.
68. Id. at 307. The Government argued that section 67 of the Hawaiian Organic Act
authorized military tribunals and that the Governor, with the approval of the President,
can declare martial law whenever public safety so requires. Id. at 312. Therefore, the
Court began its analysis by determining whether the Hawaiian Organic Act gave the mili-
tary the power to replace the civilian courts during this period of martial law. Id. at 313.
The Court looked to the language of the Act, the legislative history, and prior cases for
guidance in interpreting the Act; however, none of these sources allowed such a proce-
dure. Id. at 315-23. The Court stated, "[c]ourts and their procedural safeguards are indis-
pensable to our system of government. . . to protect the liberties [our founders] valued."
Id. at 322. Moreover, the Court noted that our government is opposed to total military
rule and "opposed to governments that placed in the hands of one man the power to
make, interpret and enforce the law." Id. The Court recognized that the "established prin-
ciple of every free people is, that the law shall alone govern; and to it the military must
always yield." Id. at 323 (quoting Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 169 (1879)).
69. Id. at 324.
70. Id.
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c. United States v. Lindh.-The same questions presented
to the courts during World War II, recently resurfaced during the war
on terrorism.7 In United States v. Lindh,72 a United States citizen,
John Phillip Walker Lindh, was captured in November 2001 in Af-
ghanistan while fighting against the Northern Alliance and the United
States.73 Prior to his capture, in mid-2001, Lindh received several
weeks of training at a terrorist training camp in Pakistan.74 After com-
pleting his training, Lindh traveled to Afghanistan where he ex-
pressed a desire to join the Taliban. 75 While at Taliban headquarters,
he agreed to receive additional military training at an al Qaeda train-
ing camp.
7 6
After Lindh completed training with al Qaeda, he traveled to
Kabul, Afghanistan where he joined with approximately 150 non-
Afghanistan fighters.7 7 Lindh then traveled to Northeastern Afghani-
stan where he and other members of his unit fought against Northern
Alliance troops.78 Finally in November 2001, Lindh and his unit re-
treated from Takhar, Afghanistan and surrendered to Northern Alli-
ance troops.79 Following his capture, Lindh was transported to a
prison compound where he was interviewed by two Americans from
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).8 After the interview, prison
detainees overpowered guards at the camp and attacked the CIA
agents.8" One CIA agent, Johnny Michael Spann, was killed during
the uprising.8 2 Lindh and other prisoners retreated to a basement in
the compound and were subsequently recaptured.8 3 As a result of his
71. See Andrew P. Napolitano, Enemy Combatants' Cast into a Constitutional Hell, L.A.
TIMES, June 27, 2003, at B17 (discussing the war on terrorism).
72. 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
73. Id. at 545.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. During his training at the al Qaeda training camp, Lindh met with Osama Bin
Laden who thanked him for taking part in the jihad movement. Id. at 546. While at the al
Qaeda training camp, Lindh "participated in 'terrorist training courses in, among other
things, weapons, orienteering, navigation, explosives and battlefield combat.'" Id.
77. Id. at 546.
78. Id. Lindh stayed with his unit after September 11, 2001, despite his knowledge that
Bin Laden had ordered the attacks against the United States and that additional attacks
were planned. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 546-47.
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actions prior to his initial capture on the battlefield, Lindh was
charged with various criminal violations.8 4
Lindh moved to have the charges dismissed on a number of ba-
ses.85 Lindh claimed that one of the counts should have been dis-
missed because he was entitled to lawful combatant immunity as a
Taliban soldier.8 6 The court recognized that lawful combatant immu-
nity is a doctrine rooted in the "customary international law of war"
and that it "forbids prosecution of soldiers for their lawful belligerent
acts committed during the course of armed conflicts against legiti-
mate military targets. '87 The court considered the Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949
(GPW),88 and concluded that Lindh was ineligible for lawful combat-
ant immunity status.8 9 Specifically, the court concluded that the
Taliban did not satisfy the criteria for lawful combatant status set forth
by the GPW.9 ° The court also deferred to the President's determina-
tion that Lindh was an unlawful enemy combatant. 1 Therefore, the
84. Id. at 547. Lindh was charged in a ten-count indictment with a wide range of crimi-
nal charges, such as conspiracy to murder nationals of the United States, conspiracy to
provide material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization, among other
charges. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 552. In addition, Lindh requested dismissal of the indictment on a number
of other grounds including, for example, that pre-trial publicity deprived him of his Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial, and that he was the victim of selective prosecution. Id. at
547-48, 552, 564.
87. Id. at 553.
88. 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (GPW).
89. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 553, 558.
90. Id. at 557-58. In order for an organization's member to qua!fy for lawful combat-
ant status, an organization must meet the following criteria: (1) "[t]he organization must
be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates"; (2) "[t]he organization's
members must have a fixed distinctive emblem or uniform recognizable at a distance"; (3)
"[tihe organization's member must carry arms openly"; and (4) "[t]he organization's
members must conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war."
Id. (citing GPW, art. 4(A) (2)). According to the court, the Taliban failed to meet the
criteria because the group lacked a hierarchical structure, failed to distinguish themselves
as uniformed soldiers, and failed to observe the laws and customs of war. Id. at 558.
91. Id. at 558. The court addressed and rejected Lindh's other challenges to the vari-
ous criminal charges against him. Specifically, the court rejected Lindh's claim that several
of the counts should be dismissed because they "charge violations of regulations that were
promulgated in excess of the statutory authority provided by the parent legislation, the
International Economic Emergency Powers Act." Id. In addition, the court rejected
Lindh's selective prosecution claim because he failed to show "both that the government's
prosecution policy had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose." Id. at 565. Lindh claimed that he was prosecuted because he associated with the
Taliban for religious reasons while entities that associated with the Taliban for non-relig-
ious reasons were not prosecuted. Id. at 565-66.
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court refused to grant lawful combatant immunity to Lindh.92 The
court also rejected Lindh's claim that several of the counts should be
dismissed because the indictment was insufficient on its face and that
Lindh's conduct did not violate the statute in question.93 Finally, the
court rejected Lindh's claim that he had not carried firearms and de-
structive devices in furtherance of crimes of violence because the un-
derlying crimes did not constitute crimes of violence.94
d. United States v. Hamdi.-In addition to capturing
Lindh, American military forces at the direction of President Bush
captured thousands of other enemy combatants while in Afghanistan.
One of those captured in the Fall of 2001 was Yaser Esam Hamdi.95 In
January 2002, Hamdi, along with other captured enemy combatants,
was transferred to Camp X-Ray, located at Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base, Cuba. 6 While at Camp X-Ray, the authorities learned that
Hamdi was born in Louisiana and may not have renounced his Ameri-
can citizenship.97 Consequently, Hamdi was transferred to the Nor-
folk Naval Station Brig in April 2002.98 In order to facilitate its
intelligence gathering efforts, the United States wanted to continue to
detain Hamdi as an enemy combatant "in accordance with the law
and customs of war."99
92. Id.
93. Id. at 574-75. The counts in question were violations of 18 U.S.C. section 2339B,
which prohibits providing material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.
Id. at 574; 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (1996).
94. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. at 578. The underlying crimes involved "providing material
support and resources and supplying services to the Taliban and al Qaeda." Id.
95. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 2003).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2002). In Ex parte Quiin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28
(1942), the Supreme Court indicated that the law of war included "that part of the law of
nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy
nations as well as of enemy individuals." Furthermore, the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of 'War of August 12, 1949, permits the capture of certain per-
sons as prisoners of war. 6 U.S.T. 3317, Article 4. If Hamdi met the requirements of Arti-
cle 4, then he could presumably be detained as a prisoner of war. However, it is unclear
whether Hamdi met the requirements of Article 4, because the Government has continu-
ally referred to him as an "enemy combatant" rather than a prisoner of war. Brief Submit-
ted by United States Attorney Paul J. McNulty on Behalf of Donald Rumsfeld, throughout,
available at http://news.findlaw.com.hdocs/hamdi/hamdirums61902gbrif.pdf (last visited
May 16, 2003). In addition, the Government's information regarding Hamdi's status as an
"enemy combatant" was in a sealed declaration. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 284. Nevertheless,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit seemed to treat the term "enemy
combatant" the same as "prisoner of war." Id. at 283. The court stated that "[i]t has long
been established that if Hamdi is indeed an 'enemy combatant' who was captured during
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To challenge the government's detention of Hamdi, his father,
Esam Fouad Hamdi, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. sections 2241 & 2242, naming himself as Hamdi's next
friend.'00 OnJune 11, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia determined that Esam Hamdi could proceed as
next friend and ordered that Hamdi have unmonitored access to
counsel."'O Specifically, the district court ordered that the meeting
should be "private between Hamdi, the attorney, and the interpreter,
without military personnel present, and without any listening or re-
cording devices of any kind being employed in any way."' 02
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in Hamdi II agreed with the district court that Hamdi's father
had filed a valid petition because he clearly had a significant relation-
ship with his son.' °3 Because Esam Hamdi's petition was valid, the
court considered the district court's June 11, 2002 order granting
Hamdi unmonitored access to counsel.'0 4 The court held that the
district court's June 11, 2002 opinion and order failed to extend
proper deference to the political branches in these current matters of
foreign policy, national security, or military affairs, and failed to ad-
dress enemy combatant status.10 5 The court thought, however, that
hostilities in Afghanistan, the government's present detention of him is a lawful one." Id.
(citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31, 37 (1942) for the proposition that United States
citizenship would not prevent the Government from holding Hamdi as a "prisoner of
war").
100. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 280. Next friend standing permits a person lacking standing
to proceed in federal court on behalf of someone who does have standing. Hamdi v. Rum-
sfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 603 (4th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Hamdi 1]. Next friend standing has
most often been invoked on behalf of prisoners who are detained and unable to seek relief
themselves either due to mental incompetence or inaccessibility. Id. On May 10, 2002,
objecting to Hamdi's detention, Frank Dunham, Federal Public Defender for the Eastern
District of Virginia, and Christian Peregrim, a private citizen, also filed writ of habeas
corpus petitions as Hamdi's next friend. Id. at 600. Peregrim had no previous relationship
with Hamdi and filed the petition as next friend "out of concern only for the unlawful
nature of [Hamdi's] incarceration." Id. at 601. Although the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia concluded that Dunham's petition was appropriately
filed, the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi I dismissed both Dunham and Peregrim's petitions be-
cause they lacked a significant relationship with Hamdi. Id. at 600.
101. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 280-81. Esam Hamdi's petition asked that the district court:
(1) grant him next friend status; (2) appoint counsel to represent Yaser Hamdi; (3) order
the government to stop all interrogations ofYaser Hamdi; and (4) order that Yaser Hamdi
be released. Id. at 280.
102. Id. at 281.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 284.
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complete dismissal of the petition was not appropriate at the time.1°6
Chief Judge Wilkinson, writing for the unanimous three judge panel,
first inferred that the Commander-in-Chief provision of Article II, sec-
tion 2 directs that much deference should extend to "military designa-
tion of individuals as enemy combatants in times of active hostilities,
as well as to their detention after capture on the field of battle."'' 0 7
Second, the court noted that the district court's order was not a
typical appointment of counsel in an ordinary criminal case and that
Hamdi's case raised serious issues, which were not addressed by the
district court.10 8 The final issue the court addressed was the Govern-
ment's request for dismissal.1 09 Unwilling to dismiss the case entirely,
the court stated that a dismissal would "embrac[e] a sweeping proposi-
tion-namely that, with no meaningful judicial review, any American
citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefi-
nitely without charges or counsel on the government's say-so."110 In
closing, the court did not give specific direction to the district court
on what procedures and standards to use on remand, but instead em-
phasized that the issue of detaining enemy combatants was not being
resolved initially and guidance should come from long established
cases upholding such detentions."'
In Hamdi III, the Fourth Circuit accepted a certified appeal con-
cerning the district court's order that required the Government to
produce various materials regarding Hamdi's status as an enemy com-
batant.'1 2 The appeal considered whether a declaration by a govern-
ment official, setting forth the Government's account of the
circumstances of Hamdi's capture, was by itself sufficient to warrant
his detention." 3 The court concluded that the declaration was a suffi-
106. Id. at 283. The court recognized that dismissal would be premature due to the
interlocutory nature of the appeal. Id. Thus, a remand was deemed the more appropriate
remedy. Id.
107. Id. at 281.
108. Id. at 282. The court pointed out that the major issue of enemy combatant status
was never even addressed by the district court. Id. In addition, the district court failed to
consider the implications of unmonitored access upon the government's intelligence gath-
ering or to what extent federal courts are permitted to review military judgments of com-
batant status. Id.
109. Id. at 283.
110. Id.
111. Id.; see, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31, 37 (1942); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327
U.S. 304, 313-14 (1946); In reTerrito, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946). In conclusion, the
court in Hamdi II noted that hazards of judicial involvement in military decisionmaking
cautioned the district court to resolve the case using the least drastic measures and sug-
gested avoiding unnecessarily intrusive steps. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 284.
112. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2002).
113. Id. at 462.
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cient basis upon which to conclude that Hamdi had been constitution-
ally detained pursuant to the war powers entrusted to the
Commander-in-Chief. 1 
4
The declaration was an affidavit signed by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, Michael Mobbs." 5 It confirmed "the material fac-
tual allegations in Hamdi's petition-specifically that he was seized in
Afghanistan by allied military forces during the course of a sanctioned
military campaign, designated an 'enemy combatant' by [the] Govern-
ment, and ultimately transferred to the Norfolk Naval Brig for deten-
tion." '16 In the Hamdi I!opinion, the Fourth Circuit had directed the
district court to review the sufficiency of the Mobb's declaration." 7
Despite the district court's recognition that the government was enti-
tled to "considerable deference in detention decisions during hostili-
ties," the district court went on to state that it was going to carefully
review and scrutinize the Mobbs' declaration.' The district court
then issued an order directing the Government to turn over numer-
ous documents related to Hamdi's capture and detention." 9 The
Government moved to certify the production order for immediate
appeal. '
20
The Fourth Circuit then reiterated the fact that the President has
the power to wage war and included in that power is the "authority to
detain those captured in armed struggle."12 ' The court also reiterated
the fact that courts owe a great deal of deference to the President's
decisions in war time. 1 22 The court, however, also indicated that the
President's discretion to make decisions in war time was not unlimited
and could, in some cases, be reviewed by the judiciary.123
114. Id. at 459.
115. Id. at 461.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 462.
118. Id. The district court was highly critical of the Mobbs' declaration and implied that
the government might be "hiding disadvantageous information from the court." Id.
119. Id. The documents included, among other things, copies of Hamdi's statements,
information pertaining to the interrogators, and statements by members of the Northern
Alliance. Id.
120. Id. The district court then certified the question regarding the sufficiency of the
Mobbs declaration alone as sufficient for "meaningful judicial review of Yaser Esam
Hamdi's classification as an enemy combatant." Id The Fourth Circuit granted the Gov-
ernment's petition for review and noted that it might address other issues included in the
certified order. Id.
121. Id. at 463.
122. Id. The court indicated that although this was not a "conventional" war, it did not
reduce the level of deference owed to the President. Id. at 464.
123. Id. The court discussed the importance of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and stated that it was the duty of the judicial
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The court found it "significant" that Hamdi had sought relief
through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, stating that "[i] n war as
in peace, habeas corpus provides one of the firmest bulwarks against
unconstitutional detentions." 124 The court determined that a habeas
petition was the proper method for Hamdi to challenge his detention
because he was an American citizen challenging his detention by the
Government. 125
In addition to considering the question of the sufficiency of the
Mobbs' declaration, the court considered two additional bases for re-
lief proposed by Hamdi, 18 U.S.C. section 4001 (a) and Article 5 of the
Geneva Convention. 126 The court rejected the first basis of relief on
the grounds that Congress had authorized the President to detain en-
emy combatants when it issued the Authorization for Use of Military
Force. 2 ' The court rejected the second basis of relief on the grounds
that the Geneva Convention is not self-executing and, therefore, does
not provide for a private right of action."' Thus, the court concluded
that there were "no purely legal barriers to Hamdi's detention. 129
The court addressed two final issues. First, it considered whether
Hamdi as a United States citizen being detained by the military on
American soil could be heard before an Article III court to challenge
the factual assertions submitted to support his enemy combatant des-
ignation. 3 ' The court held that it was unnecessary to conduct an evi-
dentiary hearing or factual inquiry because it was undisputed that
branch to defend individual freedoms, even when military forces are involved in an armed
conflict. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 465. The court indicated that the safeguards that have become expected in
connection with criminal prosecutions are not necessarily appropriate in the "arena of
armed conflict." Id.
126. Id. at 467.
127. Pub. L. No. 10740, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001). The court concluded that de-
taining enemy combatants was an "inherent part of warfare" and was therefore included in
the authorization by Congress. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 467.
128. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 468. The court concluded that even if Article 5 of the Ge-
neva Convention was self-executing and provided a private right of action, it was not clear
that an Article III court would be a competent tribunal to determine whether Article 5
applied to Hamdi's case. Id. at 469.
129. Id. at 469. The court indicated that Hamdi's petition failed as a matter of law;
therefore, the Government should not be required to comply with the district court's or-
der. Id. The court also pointed out numerous practical difficulties if the Government were
in fact required to comply with the district court's order. Id. at 470. For example, the
district court ordered the Government to provide copies of all of Hamdi's statements, a list
of all interrogators who questioned Hamdi, the name of the individual in the government
who made the determination that Hamdi was an enemy combatant, and the screening
criteria used in the enemy combatant determination. Id.
130. Id. at 473.
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Hamdi was captured in an active combat zone.' The court lastly
considered Hamdi's argument that hostilities were sufficiently at an
end, and that his detention was no longer lawful.' 3 2 The court stated
that it was not clear "[w] hether the timing of a cessation of hostilities
is justiciable" and that it was a decision best left to the executive
branch. 133
e. Padilla v. Bush.-In addition to American citizens cap-
tured abroad, the recent cases have also involved American citizens
captured on American soil and labeled as enemy combatants. Re-
cently, in Padilla v. Bush,'34 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York considered a petition for writ of habeas
corpus filed on behalf of Jose Padilla, a United States citizen held by
the Department of Defense as an enemy combatant.'35 On May 8,
2002, Padilla was arrested and taken into custody by the Justice De-
partment on a material witness warrant. The warrant was issued based
on findings that Padilla had information and knowledge material to a
grand jury investigation concerning the activities of al Qaeda.' 36 How-
ever, on June 9, 2002, President Bush issued an order withdrawing the
subpoena and designating Padilla an enemy combatant. 3 7 The Presi-
dent next directed the Department of Defense to detain Padilla and
take him into custody.'38 Currently, Padilla is being detained without
being formally charged and has no prospect of release.' 39 His attor-
ney, Donna R. Newman, acting as next friend, filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus to challenge the lawfulness of Padilla's detention
and sought an order allowing Padilla to consult with counsel. 40 The
court granted Newman next friend standing, distinguishing Hamdi I
on the basis that Newman had a pre-existing relationship with Padilla
131. Id.
132. Id. at 476.
133. Id.
134. 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
135. Id. at 569.
136. Id. at 568, 571.
137. Id. at 571. A summary of the June 9, 2002 Order set forth by the President stated
that Padilla "'is closely associated with al Qaeda', engaged in 'hostile war-like acts' includ-
ing 'preparation for acts of international terrorism' directed at this country, possesses in-
formation that would be helpful in preventing al Qaeda attacks, and represents 'a
continuing, present and grave danger to the national security of the United States."' Id. at
572.
138. Id. at 571.
139. Id. at 569. At the time of the hearing, it was not disputed that Padilla was being
held incommunicado and had not been allowed to consult with his attorney or other coun-
sel. Id. at 574.
140. Id. at 569, 571-72.
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that involved his initial apprehension and confinement under the ma-
terial warrant.
1 4
'
First, the court considered the lawfulness of Padilla's detention as
an enemy combatant. 42 The central issue involved was whether the
President has the authority to designate a United States citizen cap-
tured on American soil an enemy combatant and detain him without
trial. 143 Padilla relied on Milligan's holding that the Constitution for-
bids indefinite detention of citizens captured on American soil so
long as the courts are open and their process unobstructed. 144 How-
ever, the court observed that Milligan had been narrowed by the sub-
sequent decision in Quirin.1 45 The court recognized that although the
issue in Quiin was different from the one presented in Padilla, it nev-
ertheless relied on Quirin for guidance on distinguishing lawful and
unlawful enemy combatant status and on the President's authority to
detain unlawful enemy combatants.' 46 The court ultimately held that
the President is authorized under the Constitution and by law to di-
rect the military to detain enemy combatants.' 47 Therefore, Padilla's
detention is not per se unlawful. 148
The court then considered whether and how Padilla should be
permitted to present facts before the court in conjunction with his
habeas petition. 49 The court concluded that Padilla did have a right
to present facts at the petition hearing and that the most convenient
way for Padilla to do so was through counsel.1 5 ° Therefore, the court
concluded that Padilla could consult with counsel during prosecution
of his petition despite concerns expressed by the Government."'
141. Id. at 575-78.
142. 233 F. Supp. 2d at 587-600.
143. Id. at 593.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 594.
146. Id. at 594-96. The particular issue in Quirin was whether those petitioners could be
tried by military tribunals, whereas the issue in Padilla was whether Padilla could be held
without trial. Id. at 594.
147. Id. at 596. The court stated that the basis for the President's authority to order the
detention of an unlawful combatant arises both from the terms of the Joint Resolution and
from his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief as set forth in The Prize Cases and
other authority cited above. See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text (discussing the
President's authority to name enemy status).
148. 233 F. Supp. 2d at 599. The "detention of Padilla is not barred by 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001 (a); nor ... is it otherwise barred as a matter of law." Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. The Government argued that granting access to counsel would "jeopardize the
two core purposes of detaining enemy combatants-gathering intelligence about the en-
emy, and preventing the detainee from aiding in any future attacks against America."' Id.
at 603.
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In concluding that Padilla had a right to present facts during the
proceeding, the court first looked to relevant statutory provisions.
152
The court determined that although no provision expressly provides
for such relief, Congress intended for a habeas petitioner to be able to
present facts before the court because to prevent him from doing so
would impair the petitioner's ability to receive the remedy being re-
quested. 153 The court cited to 18 U.S.C. section 3006A(2) (B), which
permits a court to grant access to counsel in a habeas proceeding
when "the court determines 'the interests of justice so require. '154
Relying on this statute, the court determined that Padilla should be
granted access to counsel for the purpose of presenting facts at the
habeas proceeding only. 155
The court also considered whether the Fifth or Sixth Amend-
ment guaranteed Padilla access to counsel.1 56 The court concluded
that the Sixth Amendment did not provide a right of counsel in this
case because it was not a criminal proceeding. 157 The court relied on
Middendorf v. Henry1 58 and United States v. Gouveia159 to support its con-
152. Id. at 599. The statutory provisions the court considered were 28 U.S.C. sections
2241, 2243, and 2246. Id. In addition, the court looked to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Id.
153. Id. at 600.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 603. The court made it clear that it was not granting a general right to coun-
sel; therefore, counsel should not be able to interfere during any interrogations. Id. In
addition, the court permitted military personnel to monitor Padilla's meetings with coun-
sel as long as the monitoring personnel would not be involved in any future criminal prose-
cutions of Padilla. Id. at 604.
156. Id. at 600.
157. Id.
158. 425 U.S. 25 (1976). In Middendorf the Supreme Court considered a case in which
several members of the military brought suit "challenging the authority of the military to
try them at summary courts-martial without providing them with counsel." Id. at 28. In
acknowledging that the issue had never been "squarely resolved," the Court considered
past cases analyzing the types of hearings which required a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. Id. at 33, 35. For example, the Court considered that a revocation of probation
hearing, or ajuvenile proceeding, either of which could result in the deprivation of liberty,
was not a criminal proceeding, and therefore did not necessarily trigger the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. Id. at 35-36. In addition, the Court recognized that the military has
a unique function to perform, and it would not be possible to impose the same require-
ments on military courts as it does on civilian courts. Id. at 45-46. The Court thus con-
cluded that neither the Sixth Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment required counsel in
summary court-martial proceedings. Id. at 48.
Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joined, dissented and indicated that the
Sixth Amendment should apply to military courts-martial. Id. at 52 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Marshall believed that "[a]pplication of the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel to the military follow[ed] logically .. .from the modern right-to-counsel decision, in
which the right ha[d] been held fully applicable in every case in which a defendant faced a
conviction of a criminal offense and potential incarceration." Id. at 53. The dissenting
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clusion.t6 ° The court then considered the self-incrimination clause
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and whether
they provided for a constitutional guarantee of access to counsel. 6 t
The court determined that the self-incrimination clause was of no
help to Padilla because he did not face the prospect of trial. 162 In
considering whether there was a due process right to counsel, the
court discussed Mathews v. Eldrige.1 63 Ultimately, the court concluded
that because there was a statutory basis for its decision, it would not
Justices rejected the claim that military necessity justified the conclusion that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was not applicable to military courts-martial proceedings. Id.
at 63.
159. 467 U.S. 180 (1984). In Gouviea, the Supreme Court considered a claim by two
prison inmates that they were entitled to legal counsel while being held in an Administra-
tive Detention Unit (ADU) awaiting charges for murder. Id. at 182-83. William Gouveia
was serving time in a Federal Correctional Institute when he and a fellow inmate, Adolpho
Reynoso were suspected of killing a third inmate. Id. Gouveia and Reynoso were placed in
the ADU where they stayed for nineteen months before being indicted on charges of first-
degree murder. Id. at 183. During those nineteen months in the ADU, Gouveia and Rey-
noso were not provided with legal counsel. Id. They claimed that the nineteen-month
confinement in the ADU, without appointment of counsel, violated their Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. Id. The Court stated that
[i]n a line of constitutional cases in this Court stemming back to the Court's land-
mark opinion in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158
[(1984)], it has been firmly established that a person's Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judi-
cial proceedings have been initiated against him.
Id. at 187. The Court went on to state that the literal language of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel requires the existence of both a "criminal prosecutio[n]" and an "ac-
cused." Id. at 188. The Court indicated that the right to counsel extends to some "critical"
pretrial proceedings, but these proceedings are ones in which the accused is confronted by
the "procedural system, or by his expert adversary." Id. at 189.
160. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
161. Id. at 600-01.
162. Id.
163. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Supreme Court in Mathews considered a Fifth Amend-
ment due process challenge to the termination of disability insurance benefits. Id. at 323.
Eldridge challenged the constitutional validity of the administrative procedures for assess-
ing whether he had a continuing disability. Id. at 324-25. The challenge was a procedural
due process challenge because "[p]rocedural due process imposes constraints on govern-
mental decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or 'property' interests within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 332.
The Court indicated that due process requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Id.
at 333 (citation omitted). The Court also indicated that due process is a flexible concept
and the protections it affords are dictated by the particular situation. Id. at 334 (citation
omitted). As a result, the Court established a three-part balancing test to be applied when
assessing the sufficiency of procedural due process requirements. The Court identified
three distinct factors to be considered:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of Pilditional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
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rely on a due process right to counsel. 164 Therefore, the court or-
dered that Padilla may consult with counsel to aid in filing his habeas
petition, but only under conditions to minimize the likelihood that he
could use his attorneys as unwilling intermediaries for the transmis-
sion of information to others.16
5
The last issue addressed by the court in Padilla was the standard
that should be applied in determining whether the facts presented by
the Government were sufficient to warrant a finding that Padilla was
an unlawful combatant. 66 The court utilized a deferential standard
of whether the President had some evidence to support his findings
that Padilla was an enemy combatant. 167
On January 9, 2003, the Government filed a motion to reconsider
the order granting Padilla access to counsel in light of Hamdi Ilfs
decision. 6 ' Despite reconsidering the motion, the court rejected the
Government's request to deny Padilla access to counsel.' 69 The court
noted that the facts of Padilla's case were sufficiently different than
those in Hamdi III, so as not to warrant a reconsideration of the origi-
nal order granting Padilla access to counsel. 170
2. Detention of Non-Citizens.--The capture and designation of en-
emy combatants has not been confined to just United States citizens
captured during times of hostilities. In In re Yamashita,17 1 the Su-
preme Court considered whether a military commission could try a
Japanese POW after the hostilities between the United States and Ja-
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
quirement would entail.
Id. at 335. The Court applied the balancing test and concluded that the administrative
procedures that were followed were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.
Id. at 349.
164. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 601. The court indicated that when a decision can be
decided on either statutory or constitutional grounds, the statute should be the basis of the
court's decision. Id. (citation omitted).
165. Id. at 605.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 605-09. The "some evidence" standard is purposefully deferential to the Pres-
ident and his authority to name enemy combatants. Id. at 605-08. The court stated that its
inquiry is only concerned with (1) deciding whether the President was exercising his power
granted by the Constitution and law, which is determined by examining whether the Presi-
dent's conclusion was supported by "some evidence" that Padilla was engaged in a mission
against the United States on behalf of an enemy of the United States, and (2) whether that
evidence has not been mooted by subsequent events. Id. at 608-09.
168. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
169. Id. at 57.
170. Id. at 56-57.
171. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
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pan had ended. 7 2 General Yamashita claimed that the United States
could not try him because the hostilities with Japan had ended, and
he claimed that admission of evidence in question would lead to a
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
7 3
The Court recognized that Congress had the right to create mili-
tary commissions to try enemy combatants. 74 Furthermore, the
Court indicated that the rulings and judgments of military tribunals
were not reviewable by it, and that upon an application for habeas
corpus, the Court only considers whether the military commission has
the lawful power to try the petitioner for the offense charged. 175 Be-
cause the creation of military commissions was authorized, the Court
rejected General Yamashita's claim that he could not be tried by mili-
tary commission after the hostilities between the United States and
Japan had ended.
176
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Murphy expressed that "[t] he
grave issue raised by this case is whether a military commission so es-
tablished and so authorized may disregard the procedural rights of an
accused person as guaranteed by the Constitution, especially by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." 77 According to Justice
Murphy, all persons accused of a crime were guaranteed the right to
due process and there was no exception for those accused of a war
172. Id. at 6. During World War II, General Yamashita commanded Japanese forces that
allegedly committed various atrocities against the inhabitants of the Philippines. Id. at 1.
The alleged atrocities included starvation, massacre, rape, murder, torture and wanton
destruction. Id. at 29 (Murphy, J., dissenting). The case was before the Supreme Court
because General Yamashita submitted an application for leave to file a petition for writ of
habeas corpus and prohibition in the Supreme Court as well as a petition for writ of certio-
rari to review an order of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Id. at 4-6. General
Yamashita originally submitted an application for leave to file petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and prohibition in the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
but it was denied by that Court. Id.
173. Id. In addition, Yamashita claimed that admission of the depositions, affidavits,
hearsay, and opinion evidence were prohibited by the 25th and 38th Articles of War (then
codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 1496, 1509) and the Geneva Convention. Id. The Court rejected
the argument that 25th and 38th Articles of War applied to Yamashita as an enemy combat-
ant reasoning that these Articles only applied to members of the armed forces of the
United States. Id. at 21. Therefore, the Court rejected Yamashita's argument that due
process was violated in this case because he was not a member of the United States armed
forces. Id. at 23.
174. Id. at 7 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)). Congress's power to create
military commissions comes from Article I, section 8, clause 10 of the Constitution. Id.
175. Id. at 7-8.
176. Id. at 11-12. The Court indicated that in most instances the system of military jus-
fice would fail if a military commission could not try persons charged with violations of the
law of war once the hostilities ended because it is only after the cessation of hostilities that
many of the violations come to light. Id. at 12.
177. Id. at 26 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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crime or for someone possessing the status of an enemy belligerent. 178
Justice Murphy indicated that he believed the rights guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment "belong to every person in the world" and that
the rights "rise above the status of belligerency or outlawry. ' 179 The
courts have struggled with the evolving issue of what protections
should be given to an individual classified as an enemy combatant,
especially United States citizens designated as enemy combatants.
This struggle continues today as the courts are faced with the specific
question of whether a United States citizen alleged to be an enemy
combatant can be held indefinitely without charges or access to
counsel.
II. ANALYSIS
The recent cases arising from military operations in Afghanistan and
the war on terrorism raise the issue of what safeguards and procedural
protections does or should a United States citizen have once that per-
son is detained and labeled an enemy combatant by the President."8 '
This issue captures the struggle between the government's legitimate
interest in protecting its citizens against future terrorist attacks and
preserving the individual rights and liberties upon which our nation
was founded.
The government has a compelling interest in protecting its citi-
zens from terrorist attacks.' 8 ' Thus, at times it might be necessary to
detain even United States citizens in furtherance of this goal. A
habeas petition provides a sufficient safeguard against an improper or
unlawful detention and United States citizenship status does not com-
pel additional protections.1 8 2 Once one is labeled an enemy combat-
ant by the President and detained, the laws of war apply and the rights
178. Id.
179. Id. In addition, Justice Murphy stated that "[t]hey survive any popular passion or
frenzy of the moment." I& In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Rutledge wrote to
express his concern that the military commission could disregard the normal rules of evi-
dence and follow its own procedures and rules of evidence. Id. at 47 (Rutledge, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Rutledge also vehemently objected to denying General Yamashita the
safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 79. The two due process safeguards
that Justice Rutledge was most concerned about in the case were that a conviction must
rest on facts and not mere rumor or report and that the charged party has a "fair chance to
defend." Id. Justice Rutledge believed that denying due process safeguards to an enemy
belligerent could possibly lead to the denial of due process safeguards for others, "perhaps
ultimately for all." Id.
180. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 552-58 (E.D. Va. 2002); Hamdi I, 316
F.3d 450, 471-77 (2003); Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 599-608 (2002).
181. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002).
182. See, e.g., ExparteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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afforded to that person emanate from the Geneva Convention.183
The Geneva Convention does not provide for counsel merely because
of detention; and the Constitution should not be construed to guaran-
tee a right to counsel in cases where an American citizen is detained
and properly labeled an enemy combatant.184 The government has
various ways to protect its interests and it is the role of the executive
branch to determine how to use the powers it is given to accomplish
its objectives.1 85
Opposing this compelling government interest is the need to de-
fend our constitutionally protected freedoms and liberties from unbri-
dled executive action. The ability to label a United States citizen an
enemy combatant and detain the citizen indefinitely without charges
or access to counsel has no precedential support.'86 The President
can only detain a United States citizen pursuant to an Act of Con-
gress.' 87 If such detention occurs, a citizen's constitutionally pro-
tected rights guarantee the ability to challenge such detention
through a petition for writ of habeas corpus.' 88 To effectively petition
the court, however, the detainee must be given access to counsel in
order to properly bring issues and facts surrounding the detention
before the court. 189 The judicial branch, through Article III courts, is
the appropriate body to guard against executive action that infringes
on constitutional protections afforded to United States citizens. Be-
cause checks and balances are more, not less, important during times
of national crisis, United States citizens designated as enemy combat-
ants should retain these basic constitutional protections.
A. In Defense of Detaining Enemy Combatants Without Granting Them
Access to Counsel
The United States government has taken several different ap-
proaches when dealing with American citizens who take up arms
along side terrorists or otherwise support terrorist groups. One of the
183. See Padilla v. Newman, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing the
applicability of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War).
184. See 6 U.S.T. 3316, Article 105 and U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing for counsel
only in criminal prosecutions).
185. See infra notes 257-262 and accompanying text (discussing the various ways the gov-
ernment can protect its interests).
186. See infra notes 283-292 and accompanying text (discussing the misapplication of Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)).
187. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2002).
188. See infra notes 319-329 and accompanying text (recognizing the importance of
habeas corpus petitions to challenged executive detentions).
189. See infta notes 332-354 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of coun-
sel to properly petition the courts in a habeas corpus proceeding).
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more controversial approaches was that taken by the Fourth Circuit in
Hamdi III.190 This author believes, however, that Hamdi III represents
the most logical approach that the United States has taken in a terror-
ism case. t9 ' The court appropriately limited Hamdi to a petition for
writ of habeas corpus, restricted his access to counsel, and is validly
holding him in detention until hostilities end. 9 2 This approach maxi-
mizes the government's ability to gather intelligence and prevents the
detainees from engaging in additional terrorist activities. Accord-
ingly, the Court's decision in Hamdi III should be regarded as the
proper explanation of what protections are afforded to United States
citizens captured and labeled as enemy combatants.
1. The Writ of Habeas Corpus Provides a Sufficient Safeguard Against
Improper Detention.-As several courts have recognized, in the event
that a United States citizen is detained and labeled as an enemy com-
batant, the writ of habeas corpus is a sufficient safeguard to protect
that person from an improper detention. 9 3 In Hamdi I, before Yaser
Esam Hamdi's father filed a valid habeas petition as next friend, the
Public Defender for the Eastern District of Virginia and Christian Per-
egrim attempted to file habeas petitions as next friend for Hamdi.19 4
Similarly, in Padilla v. Bush, Padilla's attorney filed a habeas petition as
his next friend. 9 5 The habeas petitions specifically set forth chal-
190. Hamdi Ill, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 460-61, 471, 476.
193. See, e.g., ExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. 2, 113 (1866) (stating that "if a party is unlawfully
imprisoned the writ of habeas corpus is his appropriate legal remedy") (citation omitted).
194. Hamdi I, 294 F.3d at 600. Although the Fourth Circuit determined that neither the
Public Defender nor Peregrim had filed a valid next friend petition because they did not
have a significant relationship with Hamdi, this example demonstrates how the next friend
petition operates. Id. at 607. The fact that the Public Defender's petition was not valid
does not lessen the argument that this was the proper method for Hamdi to challenge his
detention. The court was well aware that Hamdi's father was "ready, willing, and able to
file, and in fact [had] filed, a petition as Hamdi's next friend . . ." when it reached its
conclusion. Id. at 600. Given the important nature of this issue, it is not clear whether the
court would have reached the same conclusion if Hamdi's father had not filed or been able
to file a next friend petition. The court stated,
We are not saying that an attorney can never possess next friend standing, or that
only the closest relative can serve as next friend. We simply note the contrast
here between the Public Defender and Peregrim's suits on the one hand, and the
action of the detainee's father on the other.
Id. at 607.
195. 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The court specifically pointed out that
Padilla's case was different than Hamdi's because Padilla had a preexisting relationship
with his attorney while Hamdi did not have a preexisting relationship with the Public De-
fender. Id. at 576-77. Therefore, Padilla's attorney could proceed as next friend. Id. at
578.
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lenges to the government's authority to detain Hamdi and Padilla.' 96
Therefore, a procedure was available for the enemy combatant detain-
ees to challenge their detention if they, or others on their behalf, be-
lieved it was unlawful. As the Supreme Court indicated in Milligan,
the writ of habeas corpus is the proper method for challenging an
improper or illegal detention.197 The habeas petition is proper be-
cause it brings the unlawful detention issue to an independent third
party in the court.
Once a court grants leave to file a petition for writ of habeas
corpus there is no reason to provide unmonitored access to counsel
when doing so poses a national security concern. 198 As the Supreme
Court has repeatedly made clear, it does not consider the guilt or in-
nocence of the petitioner in these types of cases; rather, it only consid-
ers whether the military commission was lawfully convened, and that it
has the power to take a particular course of action. 99 Therefore, a
person who is challenging his detention gains no benefit by having
unmonitored access to counsel because he is not preparing any type
of defense as to his guilt or innocence in a criminal proceeding. In
addition, even in cases where an enemy combatant detainee is prepar-
ing a defense against criminal charges, issues of national security
could outweigh any benefits that might be derived from unmonitored
access to counsel when certain safeguards are put into place.200
The Geneva Convention does not compel the government to pro-
vide enemy combatant detainees with access to counsel. The Geneva
196. Hamdi I, 294 F.3d 598, 601 (4th Cir. 2002); Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 587-88.
197. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 113. The Court indicated that the habeas petition was the only
way for Milligan to recover his liberty. Id. at 112. This implies that a person challenging
his detention must do so through the habeas petition because there are no other methods
available even if the person wishes to pursue a different course of action. See id. (indicating
that Milligan was "powerless to do more" than file a habeas petition).
198. In Padilla, the Government contended that granting unmonitored access to coun-
sel posed a national security concern because there was a possibility that Padilla could use
his attorney to communicate with terrorists. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 603. In Hamdi II,
the Government indicated that Hamdi's continued detention was necessary for its intelli-
gence gathering efforts and that an adversarial relationship with Hamdi would interfere
with its intelligence gathering efforts. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d 450, 466 n.4 (4th Cir. 2003).
199. ExparteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942). Although there is no indication that a mili-
tary commission was convened in Hamdi's case, Hamdi's capture and detention was af-
fected under the Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001). Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 459-60. Therefore, on the petition for habeas corpus, the
role of the court is to determine whether Hamdi can be detained under the Authorization
for Use of Military Force, rather than under the authority of a military commission.
200. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 604 (determining that Padilla's discussions with his
lawyers could be monitored by military personnel, provided that the personnel monitoring
the discussions were insulated from any activity in connection with the petition, or in con-
nection with a future criminal prosecution).
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Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August
12, 1949, (GPW) only affords a prisoner of war the right to counsel
when he has been charged with a crime.2 °1 Article 105 of the GPW
states:
The prisoner of war shall be entitled to assistance by one of
his prisoner comrades, to defense by a qualified advocate or
counsel of his own choice, to the calling of witnesses and, if
he deems necessary, to the services of a competent inter-
preter. He shall be advised of these rights by the Detaining
Power in due time before the trial. 2
As the plain language of Article 105 makes clear, it only applies
when the prisoner of war is subject to a trial.20 3 Therefore, it is im-
plicit that the right to counsel only exists when the prisoner of war has
been charged with a crime. Unmonitored access to counsel may be
necessary to prepare a defense to criminal charges, but that is not the
case in Hamdi or Padilla as neither was charged with a crime. In addi-
tion, Article 5 of the GPW states:
The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred
to in Article 4 from the time they fall into the power of the
enemy and until their final release and repatriation. Should
any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the en-
emy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4,
such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Con-
vention until such time as their status has been determined
by a competent tribunal. °4
The writ of habeas corpus is sufficient to guarantee the rights the
Geneva Convention affords an enemy combatant detainee. 20 5 For ex-
201. The Hamdi II court did not directly address the question of whether or not Hamdi
was a prisoner of war. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002). It is also unclear
whether the Government contended that Hamdi is a prisoner of war or something differ-
ent because the Government continually referred to Hamdi as an "enemy combatant"
rather than a prisoner of war. Id at 282. This author is treating the terms "enemy combat-
ant" and "prisoner of war" as interchangeable.
202. 6 U.S.T. 3316, Article 105.
203. See id.
204. 6 U.S.T. 3316, Article 5. Article 4 of the GPW defines who may qualify for lawful
combatant status. See supra note 90 (stating necessary qualifications).
205. There is a question as to whether the GPW provides for a private cause of action.
In Hamdi III, the Fourth Circuit indicated that Article 5 of the GPW did not apply to
Hamdi's case because the GPW is not self-executing and as such "does not 'create private
rights of action in the domestic courts of the signatory countries.'" 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th
Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). But see United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 794 (S.D.
Fla. 1992) (indicating that the GPW is self-executing and provides a POW with a right of
action in a United States court for a violation of its provisions). In either event, the GPW
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ample, Article 5 of the GPW indicates that if there is doubt as to
whether a person falls into one of the categories enumerated in Arti-
cle 4, the person will be afforded the rights in the GPW until the per-
son's status has been determined by a "competent tribunal. 2 °6 In the
United States, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper
process to bring this issue before the court. 20 7 Unmonitored access to
counsel is simply not necessary to challenge the detainee's status as an
enemy belligerent, and the GPW makes no reference to the right to
counsel when doing so.
In addition to the Geneva Convention, it is informative to ex-
amine the Lieber Code of 1863 to determine what rights a prisoner of
war has today.2 8 The Lieber Code does not afford a prisoner of war
the right to counsel. This omission is particularly informative because
the Lieber Code controlled the conduct of the Union Army during
the American Civil War. 20 9 At the time of its making, the drafters of
the Lieber Code recognized that United States citizens would become
involved in the war against the United States. In such situations, they
would be treated as either prisoners of war or charged with treason. 21 0
In either event, there was no general right to counsel as a prisoner of
war. This is instructive for two reasons. First, the Lieber Code served
as a basis for many of the modern law of war treaties.2 1 Second, the
does not provide a general right to counsel whether or not it provides for a private right of
action for a POW. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text (discussing Article 105
of the GPW).
206. 6 U.S.T. 3316, Article 5. The GPW does not define "competent tribunal."
207. The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to challenge the detention of an indi-
vidual; therefore, it would also be the appropriate method to determine if an individual
falls into the categories enumerated in Article 4 of the GPW. See generally In re Yamashita,
327 U.S. 1 (1946). General Yamashita claimed that the United States acted in violation of
the Geneva Convention and used the writ of habeas corpus to challenge the allegedly
improper actions. Id. at 6. This implies that the United States' court system would be the
proper place to determine whether the actions of the United States are in compliance with
the Geneva Convention.
208. The Lieber Code of 1863, http://vww.civilwarhome.com/liebercode.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 13, 2003). The Lieber Code is important because it served as the basis for the
modem law of war treaties, and is therefore, a good starting point to examine what rights
countries historically have afforded prisoners of war. Id. The Lieber Code contains 157
Articles, and not one of them gives a prisoner of war the general right to counsel to chal-
lenge his prisoner of war status. Id.
209. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553 n.19 (E.D. Va. 2002).
210. See Articles 153 and 157 of the Lieber Code of 1863. Article 153 deals with rebels,
who were presumably United States citizens prior to the war, being captured as prisoners
of war. Article 157 specifically states that "[a]rmed or unarmed resistance by citizens of the
United States against the lawful movements of their troops is levying war against the
United States, and is therefore treason." Lieber Code of 1863, Article 157, at http://
www.civilwarhome.com/leibercode.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
211. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 553 n.19.
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drafters of the Lieber Code knew unequivocally that they would be
dealing with United States citizens because the Code was enacted in
1863 and governed the Union Army during the Civil War.2 12 If there
was a general right to counsel for United States citizens held by the
United States as prisoners of war, one would certainly expect this right
to be reflected in the Lieber Code. This right was not reflected in the
Code; therefore, it is implicit that the right did not exist.
2. The Constitution Does Not Guarantee Access to Counsel for Enemy
Combatants.-Even if the Geneva Convention does not apply, constitu-
tional protections do not guarantee the right to counsel for an enemy
combatant detainee.
a. The Sixth Amendment Does Not Provide Access to Counsel for
an Enemy Combatant Detainee.-An enemy combatant detainee is not
and should not be afforded the right to counsel to challenge his de-
tention under the Sixth Amendment.213 The Sixth Amendment only
guarantees access to counsel in criminal prosecutions. 2 4 Because the
United States has not criminally charged either Hamdi or Padilla, the
Hamdi and Padilla courts have properly declined to find a constitu-
tional guarantee of access to counsel in these cases.215 The Supreme
Court has previously acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment does
not apply to all types of proceedings. In Middendorf the Court stated
that "a proceeding which may result in deprivation of liberty is none-
theless not a 'criminal proceeding' within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment if there are elements about it which sufficiently distin-
guish it from a traditional civilian criminal trial. '216 The detention of
Padilla and Hamdi is easily distinguishable from a "traditional civilian
212. Id.
213. See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that where
there are no criminal charges a Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not arise).
214. The Sixth Amendment states in pertinent part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial... and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
215. The information giving rise to Hamdi's status as an enemy combatant is contained
in a sealed declaration. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2002). President Bush desig-
nated Padilla an "enemy combatant." Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 569. If the government is
claiming that Hamdi is an unlawful enemy combatant, this fact does not change the analy-
sis as to his right of access to counsel. If Hamdi is an unlawful enemy combatant, he is
subject to capture and possibly subject to criminal prosecution for his acts. See Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942). If he is a lawful enemy combatant he is subject to cap-
ture, but not to prosecution for his lawful belligerent acts. See id. In either event, Hamdi
has not been charged with a crime; therefore, the right to counsel does not yet attach. See
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (concluding the right to counsel only
attaches at the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings).
216. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 38 (1976).
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criminal trial" because the United States has not charged them with
any criminal violations and they are not standing trial.21 7
In Gouveia, the Supreme Court determined that two prison in-
mates did not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel while being
held in an Administrative Detention Unit (ADU) awaiting an indict-
ment for murder.2 8 The Court considered the plain language of the
Sixth Amendment and its purpose and concluded that the right to
counsel attaches only at the initiation of adversarial judicial proceed-
ings. 219 The Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment "requires
the existence of both a 'criminal prosecutio[n]' and an 'accused.' "220
The Court further indicated that the "core purpose" of the right to
counsel "is to assure aid at trial, 'when the accused [is] confronted
with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public
prosecutor.' ",221 Hamdi and Padilla have not been charged with a
crime, thus the two elements necessary to trigger the right to counsel
are lacking. Therefore, the Sixth Amendment should not apply in
either case nor should it apply in future cases where American citizens
are labeled and detained as enemy combatants.
b. The Fifth Amendment Does Not Compel Access to Counsel.-
Like the Sixth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment does not guarantee
an American enemy combatant detainee access to counsel and cer-
tainly not unmonitored access to counsel.22 2 The Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment does not guarantee an enemy combatant de-
tainee access to counsel because due process is a flexible concept that
is dictated by the circumstances of a particular set of facts.2 23 The
Supreme Court has recognized that due process is not a static con-
217. See Hamdi Il, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that the protections af-
forded in criminal prosecutions do not translate well to the arena of armed conflict); Pa-
dilta, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 569 (stating that Padilla is being held without formal criminal
charges).
218. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 187. The inmates were held in the ADU for more than
nineteen months and each requested access to counsel during that time. Id. at 186.
219. Id. at 189.
220. Id. at 188 (alteration in original).
221. Id. at 188-89 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
222. The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ....
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
223. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (citation omitted).
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cept; rather, it is a balance among several factors. 224 The factors are:
(1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2)
"the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the pro-
cedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail. ' 225 In these cases, courts should strike a balance between an
enemy combatant detainee's interest in having unmonitored access to
counsel and the government's interest in protecting national security
and the welfare of its citizens.
Hamdi argued that he could best challenge the legality of his de-
tention if he had unmonitored access to counsel.226 Admittedly,
Hamdi's interest in being free from an unlawful detention is very
strong. However, he can challenge his detention through a petition
for writ of habeas corpus even without unmonitored access to coun-
sel.227 As previously discussed, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is a
sufficient safeguard to protect his interest and thus satisfies due pro-
cess. 2 28 Giving Hamdi unmonitored access to counsel in no way en-
hances his ability to challenge his detention because the court is not
considering his guilt or innocence. 229 Therefore, unmonitored access
to counsel in this context is unnecessary for the purposes asserted by
Hamdi.
Allowing Hamdi to have unmonitored access to counsel, however,
could directly harm the government's interest in protecting the na-
tion against future acts of terrorism.2' ° As the Hamdi court stated,
"[the] government has no more profound responsibility than the pro-
tection of Americans, both military and civilian, against additional un-
224. Id at 334-35.
225. Id. at 335.
226. See Hamdi I, 294 F.3d 598, 602 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the district court
ordered unmonitored access to counsel "'because of fundamental justice provided under
the Constitution of the United States' "). In Hamdi III, however, the court did not address
the issue of unmonitored access to counsel because that issue was not raised on appeal.
316 F.3d 450, 466 n.4 (4th Cir. 2003). Although Hamdi did not raise the issue of un-
monitored access to counsel on appeal, this issue is still relevant to the ongoing debate and
is included for that reason.
227. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 113 (1866).
228. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text (discussing the sufficiency of the
habeas petition).
229. See In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) (stating that the court does not consider a
petitioner's guilt or innocence in a habeas petition).
230. See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing that
access to counsel during interrogation could cause interference with intelligence gathering
efforts).
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provoked attack. '2 31 One of the government's primary interests in
preventing Hamdi from meeting with counsel is its ability to gather
intelligence.2" 2 If Hamdi has the opportunity to meet with counsel, it
is possible that counsel will advise him not to cooperate with authori-
ties if the information would be used against him at a later proceed-
ing. This will directly impact the government's ability to gather
intelligence that could aid in the battle against al Qaeda and the other
terrorist organizations. Hamdi also could take advantage of un-
monitored access to counsel to pass messages to terrorists. 233 Balanc-
ing the government's strong interests in this case against Hamdi's
interests, the court properly denied him unmonitored access to
counsel.
In Padilla, the Government similarly argued against granting Pa-
dilla access to counsel due to concerns that Padilla could use his attor-
ney to pass messages to al Qaeda operatives and that the presence of
counsel would interfere with interrogations. 23 '4 The court determined
that under these circumstances, these concerns were not strong
enough to deny Padilla access to counsel.235 However, the court ex-
plained that it was not granting Padilla a general right to counsel.236
Therefore, Padilla's counsel would not be able to interfere with inter-
rogations. 23' The court relied on the fact that Padilla had already met
in private with his attorney on several occasions after he was taken into
custody on the material witness warrant.238 The court determined
that military authorities could monitor Padilla's meetings with counsel
so long as the monitoring personnel were not involved in any future
231. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002).
232. Id. at 280.
233. See, e.g., Lynne Stewart Indictment, 02 Crim. 395 (discussing the potential use of
counsel to contact other terrorists), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ter-
rorism/ussattar040902ind.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2002). Sheik Abdel Rahman's defense
attorney, Lynn Stewart, was indicted for conspiring to provide material support or re-
sources to designated foreign terrorist organizations, seditious conspiracy, and other
charges because she is alleged to have assisted Rahman in communicating with other ter-
rorists after his incarceration. Id. Rahman was convicted of seditious conspiracy, which
was related to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Id. The Padilla court, however,
indicated that this was not a concern. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. at 605 (indicating that
Padilla's situation differed from Hamdi's because Padilla had access to counsel before his
designation as an enemy combatant, and thus an order barring access to counsel would
have been ineffective).
234. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
235. Id. at 603-04.
236. Id. at 603.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 604. Therefore, any damage that might result from allowing Padilla to meet
with counsel could already have occurred. Id.
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criminal prosecution.239 Based on these facts, the court recognized
that granting Padilla access to counsel for the purpose of presenting
facts in connection with the habeas petition would not result in the
harm feared. 24" Thus, the Padilla court applied the Mathews balancing
test in favor of limited access to counsel for Padilla.
The result in Padilla does not support an argument that Hamdi
should have been granted access to counsel. First, the President did
not initially designate Padilla as an enemy combatant. 241  Hamdi, on
the other hand, was one of many enemy combatants taken into cus-
tody in Afghanistan fighting against American and allied forces.24 2
Second, unlike Padilla, Hamdi had not met with counsel previously.
24 3
Third, the Padilla court specifically permitted military personnel to
monitor the meetings between Padilla and his counsel. 24 In Hamdi,
however, the district court strictly forbid military or any other govern-
ment personnel from monitoring Hamdi's meetings with counsel.245
Finally, the Padilla court, unlike the district court in Hamdi, granted
Padilla access to counsel only for the purpose of presenting facts at
the habeas petition hearing.246 Therefore, the result in Padilla sup-
ports neither a contrary result in Hamdi, nor the notion that the court
should provide enemy combatants access to counsel in all cases.
Rather, the courts must continue to weigh the government's interest
against those of the enemy combatant detainees, just as the Hamdi III
and Padilla courts did.
c. United States Citizenship Does Not Affect the Constitutional
Analysis of Access to Counsel.-Courts have routinely rejected the argu-
ment that an enemy combatant's United States citizenship affords him
rights beyond those afforded to other prisoners of war.247 Therefore,
an enemy combatant detainee's status as a United States citizen does
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 568-69, 571. Padilla was taken into custody as a material witness on May 8,
2002. Id. at 568-69. The Government did not reveal that the President had designated
Padilla an enemy combatant until June 9, 2002. Id. at 571.
242. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2002).
243. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
244. Id. at 604.
245. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 281.
246. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
247. See In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946) (finding no support for the
proposition that United States citizenship affects the status of a prisoner of war captured
on the field of battle); see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942) (noting that
"[c]itizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the
consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the law of war").
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not guarantee him unmonitored access to counsel. 2 48 An enemy com-
batant detainee must rely on the Geneva Convention, rather than the
Constitution, for the rights he has as a prisoner of war.24' As dis-
cussed above, the GPW provides access to counsel when a country has
charged a prisoner of war with a crime.250 Article 4 of the GPW, how-
ever, does not make a distinction between citizen and non-citizen per-
sonnel subject to capture as prisoners of war.251' This language makes
implicit that a detainee will not have any additional rights, even if he
is a citizen of the country detaining him.
d. Indefinite Length of Detention Is Not Unconstitutional.-In Pa-
dilla, the court, relying on Supreme Court precedent, specifically re-
jected an argument that an indefinite period of detention is
unconstitutional.252 The court discussed civil commitments of per-
sons under Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act and concluded
there was no per se ban on detentions that are indefinite in nature.253
Therefore, even though not all enemy combatants' detentions end at
a predetermined point, they are nonetheless proper. The court spe-
cifically left open the question of when an indefinite detention might
become "too long. '2 54 The court indicated that it would not address
this question until a credible argument could be made that a deten-
tion was too long based on the "sheer duration of his confinement or
the diminution or outright cessation of hostilities. ' 255 But the court
properly concluded that an indefinite detention is not per se unconsti-
tutional.
3. The Government's Treatment of Other United States Citizens
Captured in Afghanistan Is Irrelevant.-The government has treated
Hamdi differently than at least one other United States citizen who
248. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 596, 603 (stating that the President can detain United
States citizens as unlawful enemy combatants and permit military personnel to monitor
Padilla's meetings with his attorney). See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the distinction between lawful and unlawful enemy combatants).
249. See generally Territo, 156 F.2d at 142 (applying the Geneva Convention to determine
Territo's rights).
250. GWP, supra note 88, at Article 105.
251. Id. at Art. 4. Article 4 specifies who is subject to capture as a prisoner of war. Id.
252. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 591 ("Moreover, insofar as the argument assumes that
indefinite confinement of one not convicted of a crime is per se unconstitutional, that as-
sumption is simply wrong.").
253. Id. In Kansas v. Hendficks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), the Supreme Court upheld a Kan-
sas statute that permitted indefinite civil commitment of individuals who were likely to
commit violent sexual acts. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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was captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan. 256 This difference in
treatment is irrelevant, however, because the government can protect
its interests in more than one way. Therefore, this differential treat-
ment should not be used to argue that all enemy combatants should
be treated in the same way. In one instance, the government may
choose to use criminal prosecution to protect its interests, 257 while in
another instance it can decide to use the laws of war to protect its
interests.258 In Hamdi's case, the government believed that the pros-
pect of gathering intelligence was important, so it chose to detain
Hamdi as an enemy combatant rather than to pursue criminal charges
against him. 259 As previously discussed, charging Hamdi criminally
would have necessitated giving him access to counsel, which most
likely would have hampered the government's ability to gather
intelligence.26 °
The fact that the government elected to treat Hamdi, Padilla, and
Lindh differently lends support to the government's actions in these
cases. Where there is little or no intelligence gathering potential, the
government can choose to charge criminally rather than to detain.261
In Hamdi's case, the government obviously believed the potential to
256. See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002). Lindh is a United
States citizen who the United States captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan. Id. at 545.
The Government charged Lindh, in a civilian court, with various criminal offenses related
to his activities while fighting for al Qaeda. Id. at 547.
257. See id. at 566 (listing nine factors that play important roles in the decision to prose-
cute). This is analogous to the Government's use of plea bargaining. In some instances
the government will permit a defendant to plea to a lesser crime or even drop criminal
charges altogether in exchange for information that will facilitate further criminal prosecu-
tions. See United States v. Ruiz, 122 S. Ct. 2450, 2457 (2002) (recognizing that plea bar-
gaining is a beneficial part of the criminal justice process). There is seldom complaint
from either the defense attorneys or prosecution in these cases because it serves the inter-
ests of both parties. See id. Plea bargaining helps defense attorneys get better deals for
their clients and allows the prosecution to dispose of cases.
258. The Constitution compels the President to "preserve, protect and defend the Con-
stitution of the United States." U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. Therefore, the President
should be able to exercise his authority as commander-in-chief to designate individuals as
unlawful enemy combatants if it is necessary to protect our national security. In addition,
the Authorization for use of Military Force provides the President with authority to do what
is necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks. Pub. Law No. 10740, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224,
224 (2001).
259. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2002).
260. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (discussing what could happen if the
court granted Hamdi access to counsel).
261. United States officials recognized that Lindh held a low-level position within al
Qaeda and would not be a valuable source of intelligence. Richard Sisk, Taliban Yank's
Held Inside Shipping Bin, N.Y. DALY NEws, Dec. 12, 2001, at 8. Padilla, on the other hand,
could potentially offer valuable intelligence that could aid the government in preventing
future terrorist attacks. During a press briefing, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
summarized how the government was dealing with Padilla:
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gather intelligence outweighed the benefit of charging Hamdi crimi-
nally.2 62 This does not suggest any sort of evil or improper motive by
the government. Rather, it reflects the government's attempt to pro-
tect American citizens against similar future attacks. In the future, the
government should maintain this liberty of choice and not be pige-
onholed into treating all enemy combatant detainees the same.
As the Geneva Convention makes clear, prisoners of war are not
afforded right to counsel solely because they are captured.263 Nor
does the Constitution afford an enemy combatant detainee the right
to counsel where the United States has not charged the detainee with
a crime.2 64 United States citizenship status does not give an enemy
combatant the right to counsel.26 5 There are sufficient safeguards in
place to protect enemy combatant detainees from an improper or un-
lawful detention. The detainee or a next friend can file a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the detention. 266 The Supreme
Court has long recognized that a writ of habeas corpus is the proper
method to challenge a detention when the detainee believes it is im-
proper.267 The Hamdi III court acknowledged these facts and prop-
erly limited Hamdi to the writ of habeas corpus to challenge his
detention. 268 Nothing else was required, nor should it be.
B. Concerns and Implications for Individual Rights and Liberties-A
Defense of Constitutional Protections for "Enemy Combatants"
The terrorists that attacked our nation on September 11, 2001
tragically took many innocent American lives. However, in the haste
to bring these criminals to justice, the President has overstepped his
authority and directly dismissed the constitutionally protected free-
doms and liberties of United States citizens. The President designated
several United States citizens captured in response to the terrorist at-
Here is an individual who has intelligence information, and it is, in answer to the
last part of your question-will be submitted to a military court, or something like
that-our interest really in his case is not law enforcement, it is not punishment
because he was a terrorist or working with the terrorists. Our interest at the mo-
ment is to try and find out everything he knows so that hopefully we can stop
other terrorist acts.
Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 573-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
262. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 280.
263. GPW, supra note 88, at Article 105.
264. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (concluding that the right to
counsel only attaches when adversarial judicial proceedings are initiated).
265. See In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946).
266. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 280-81.
267. SeeExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. 2, 113 (1866).
268. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d 450, 471 (4th Cir. 2003).
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tacks as "enemy combatants," and, thus, has detained them indefi-
nitely without charges or access to counsel. 269 To justify these
detentions, the courts and the President have misapplied and inap-
propriately relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Quiin, a faulty
judicial opinion based upon a predetermined outcome. Further-
more, the law states that a United States citizen cannot be imprisoned
or otherwise detained by the Government unless charged with violat-
ing an Act of Congress. To date, Congress has not authorized the
President to detain United States citizens without charges and no for-
mal charges have been filed against these enemy combatants. 27 ° Such
unlawful detentions, if they do occur, nevertheless still require that a
citizen be able to challenge his detention through a habeas petition
and be given access to counsel to properly petition the courts.
In addition, the legal precedent states that with respect to United
States citizens there are only two ways to try "enemy combatants,"
through Article III courts or military commissions. The judicial
branch, specifically Article III courts, is the appropriate body to pro-
tect against executive branch infringement on individual rights and
freedoms. Therefore, Article III courts, which maintain inherent con-
stitutional protections, are the proper fora to prosecute and severely
punish United States citizens who commit unlawful actions against the
United States.
1. The Court Misapplied Quirin's Enemy Combatant Designation to
Justfy Detention of United States Citizens.-Designating a person as an
enemy combatant allows the President to detain a United States citi-
zen indefinitely without charges or access to counsel.2 7 ' A threshold
question that warrants consideration is-what is an enemy combatant?
The courts and the President in recent cases addressing this issue have
relied on Quirin, a World War II-era case, to define the term.27 2 How-
ever, the Supreme Court in Quiin based its opinion on inherently
flawed and forced reasoning.27 The Quiin Court also ignored its ear-
lier decision in Milligan, which stated that a United States citizen can-
not be tried before a military tribunal if Article III courts are
269. Id. at 459-60; see Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
270. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2002).
271. See Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 283.
272. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 467-69, 474-75; Padilla,
233 F. Supp. 2d at 593-96.
273. Edward Lazarus, The History and Precedential Value of the Supreme Court Case Cited in
Support of the Bush Administration's Military Tribunals, at http://writ.findlaw.com/lazarus/
20011211.htnl (Dec. 11, 2001).
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available. 2 74 Furthermore, the Quirin decision does not stand for the
proposition that the Government can detain a United States citizen
indefinitely without charges or access to counsel.2 v5 The Quiin deci-
sion, thus, is an inherently flawed basis to support the President's des-
ignation of a United States citizen as an enemy combatant.
In addition, the courts in Hamdi and Padilla expanded the hold-
ing of Quiin to justify the detention of Hamdi and Padilla indefinitely
without charges or access to counsel. 2 76 Although the term enemy
combatant has no clear definition, the courts have inappropriately
used the label to allow the President the ability to classify and detain
United States citizens without constitutional protections. This unde-
fined designation creates a dangerous scenario where executive power
can trump individual rights and liberties.
In Quirin, the Supreme Court used the term enemy combatant
and explained it by dividing the designation into two subcategories-
lawful and unlawful combatants. 277 The Court noted that "[1]awful
combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war
by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject
to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and
punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belliger-
ency unlawful."
2 78
Courts have interpreted this definition by employing four criteria
to determine the lawfulness of an armed force: whether the force (1)
is commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, (2) has a
fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance, (3) carries arms
openly, and (4) conducts their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.2 79 In Quirin, the Court seemed to focus more
heavily on the second element-whether the combatant was in uni-
form. 28" The German saboteurs in that case were captured on Ameri-
274. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123 (1866).
275. Neal R. Sonnett et al., Am. B. Ass'n, Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants,
Report to the House of Delegates, Feb. 2003, at 4. See generally Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1 (permitting
German saboteurs, one being a United States citizen, writ of habeas corpus with assistance
of counsel to challenge detention and trial by Military Commission).
276. Hamdi IlI, 316 F.3d at 469; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 594-96.
277. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
278. Id.
279. GPW, supra note 88, at art. 4(2); Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 592.
280. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31. The Court stated:
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent
in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the
enemy, or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the
lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar
examples of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the
1011
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 62:975
can soil and not in enemy uniform, plotting to commit severe
destructive acts in the United States. 281 Therefore, the Court found
the saboteurs to be unlawful enemy combatants and held that the gov-
ernment could detain and try them in military tribunals, even though
one of the men was a United States citizen.282
In so holding, the Court overlooked Milligan, which specifically
held that a United States citizen cannot be tried in a military tribunal
if Article III courts are available. 283 By ignoring this precedent, the
Court fashioned a decision to justify the predetermined, unfortunate
outcome. The saboteurs in Quifin had been hung by order from a
military tribunal prior to the Court's opinion. 2 4  Therefore, the
Court was forced into crafting a decision thatjustified trying and pun-
ishing a United States citizen in a military tribunal.285 The Quiin de-
cision, therefore, stands for the inappropriate proposition that a
United States citizen captured during a time of war and labeled an
enemy combatant may be tried in a military tribunal. 286 The Hamdi
and Padilla courts' sole reliance on Quirin to justify the labeling and
treatment of Hamdi and Padilla as enemy combatants is erroneous. 287
Furthermore, nothing in the Quiin decision supports the indefinite
detention of a United States citizen labeled an enemy combatant or
complete denial of access to counsel.288 In fact, the government gave
statue of prisoner of war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial
and punishment by military tribunals.
Id.
281. Id. at 21.
282. Id. at 37-38, 47. Haupt, one of the saboteurs, argued that he obtained United
States citizenship when he was five years old. Id. at 20. The Government, however, argued
that Haupt renounced or abandoned his citizenship through his actions by receiving train-
ing and payments from the German government to conduct acts of sabotage in the United
States. Id. The Court did not resolve the citizenship issue because it instead found the
saboteurs to be unlawful enemy combatants subject to military tribunals. Id. at 20, 37, 41.
283. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123 (1866).
284. Lazarus, supra note 273. The Quiin Court convened a special session to hear the
oral argument on the legality of the tribunal. Id. As a result, the Court concluded that the
charges against the saboteurs were susceptible to trial by a military court, and that the
military court was lawfully constituted. Id. However, the ruling was announced prior to
the Court's written opinion. Id. ChiefJustice Stone found the task ofjustifying the Court's
ruling difficult, but there was no turning back because the government already executed a
few of the saboteurs. Id. Justice Douglas later commented that "'experience with [the
Quirin case] indicated ... to all of us that it is extremely undesirable to announce a deci-
sion on the merits without an opinion accompanying it. Because once the search for the
grounds . . .is made, sometimes those grounds crumble.'" Id. (omission in original).
285. Id.
286. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 47.
287. Hamdi 111, 316 F.3d 450, 469, 474-75 (4th Cir. 2003); Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp.
2d 564, 594-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
288. Sonnett et al., supra note 275, at 4.
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all of these protections to the Quirin saboteurs.289 Therefore, this in-
appropriate inferential leap in Hamdi and Padilla leads us down the
slippery slope of unfettered executive discretion without appropriate
safeguards and protections for United States citizens.
In both Hamdi and Padilla, the courts relied heavily on Quifin in
their analysis.290 However, the issue presented in Hamdi and Padilla is
different from that presented in Quinin.291 In Quifin, the issue was
whether a United States citizen designated as an enemy combatant
could be tried by a military tribunal.292 In contrast, Hamdi and Padilla
focus on whether Hamdi and Padilla are enemy combatants and
whether the government can hold them without trial.293 In essence,
the government has coined the term "enemy combatant" without a
clear definition of what an enemy combatant is. It is unconscionable
for United States citizens to be detained without sufficient procedures
to challenge such detentions and without proper checks by the other
branches of government. Therefore, without any clear description of
an enemy combatant, it is possible that any United States citizen could
be named an enemy combatant and detained indefinitely by the gov-
ernment. Furthermore, once detained a citizen can be held incom-
municado, without charges or access to counsel, and denied
meaningful judicial review of such detention all on the basis of an
undefined Presidential designation.29
4
2. A United States Citizen Cannot Be Detained Indefinitely.-A
United States citizen cannot be detained by the government without
authorization from Congress, and neither the Joint Resolution author-
izing the use of force nor any laws enacted in response to the terrorist
289. Id
290. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 474-77. The Hamdi III court stated that "[t]he Quirin princi-
ple applies here. One who takes up arms against the United States in a foreign theater of
war, regardless of his citizenship, may properly be designated an enemy combatant and
treated as such." Id. at 475; see also Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 594-96. Ironically, the Padilla
court noted that the issue in Quirin-whether the saboteurs could be tried by military
tribunal-was not the same as the issue presented in Padilla-whether Padilla could be
held without trial. Id. at 594. However, the court still relied on Quirin in distinguishing
between lawful and unlawful combatants and the different treatment to which each is po-
tentially subject. Id.
291. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 474-77; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 594.
292. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 37-38, 47 (1942).
293. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 467-69, 474-75; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 594.
294. See Michael Greenberger, The Law of Counterterrorism Wants You!, 35 MD. BJ. Nov.-
Dec. 2002, at 13-14 (hypothesizing that a United States citizen could be declared an enemy
combatant and taken into custody by the FBI on the basis of a false report from a third
party that the citizen had access to plans leading to terrorism. While detained as an enemy
combatant the innocent citizen is denied traditional constitutional rights similar to Hamdi
and Padilla).
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attacks on September 11, 2001 authorize the detention of a United
States citizen as an "enemy combatant. '29 5 In Hamdi and Padilla, the
Government argued that an alleged enemy combatant, even a United
States citizen, can be detained indefinitely without charges or access
to counsel.296 However, Title 18, section 4001 (a) of the United States
Code clearly states that the United States cannot detain a citizen ex-
cept pursuant to an Act of Congress.297 Therefore, without an Act of
Congress, the Executive's continued detention of Hamdi and Padilla,
both United States citizens, is unlawful. As the proper check to the
President's actions, the courts should have been cognizant of the fact
that there had been no congressional authorization to detain Hamdi
or Padilla. In addition, the courts should have done their job to pre-
vent these unlawful detentions by allowing these United States citizens
access to counsel and access to Article III courts to challenge the Presi-
dent's unjust detentions.
Congress enacted section 4001 (a) in 1971 in response to the
Emergency Detention Act of 1950, which enabled the United States to
detain people, even American citizens, without a trial if the President
declared an internal security emergency.298 The House Report ac-
companying the Act noted much debate and found it significant that
the Attorney General recommended having the Act repealed.299
Therefore, the House Judiciary Committee emphasized Congress's in-
tent in the revised statutory provision:
[I]t is not enough merely to repeal the Detention Act ....
Repeal alone might leave citizens subject to arbitrary execu-
tive action, with no clear demarcation of the limits of execu-
tive authority. . . . The Committee believes that
295. Sonnett et al., supra note 275, at 5.
296. Hamdi 1!, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002); Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 574.
297. 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) (2002).
298. Enacted at the beginning of the Korean War, the Act allowed for the "apprehen-
sion and detention, during internal security emergencies, of individuals deemed likely to
engage in espionage or sabotage." H.R. REP. No. 92-116 (Apr. 6, 1971), reprinted in 1971
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1435, 1436.
299. Id. at 1437. The Attorney General was responsible for dealing with subversion and
the Act would have given the Attorney General more freedom to institute such responsibil-
ity. Id. Therefore, it is significant that the Attorney General, who would have gained more
power under the Act, did not support the Act and actually recommended its repeal. Id. In
a letter to Congress in 1969, the Justice Department acknowledged, "'the continuation of
the Emergency Detention Act is extremely offensive to many Americans .... [R]epeal of
this legislation will allay the fears and suspicions ... of many of our citizens."' Id. (quoting
a letter from Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst to Chairman Celler of the House Judici-
ary Committee). The letter went on to state that "'[the] benefit outweighs any potential
advantage which the Act may provide in a time of internal security emergency."' Id.
(same).
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imprisonment or other detention of citizens should be lim-
ited to situations in which a statutory authorization, an Act of
Congress, exists. 00
Congress recognized that in times of national emergency, detention
of United States citizens may be necessary.301 However, Congress also
recognized that a statute that gives the President so much unchecked
power could cause extreme discomfort, fear, and resentment by citi-
zens, not to mention, the potential unconstitutional validity of such a
statute.0 2 Congress specifically weighed the competing interests and
adopted a law that did not give unbridled power to the President, but
instead left it to Congress to decide when the government could de-
tain a United States citizen.30 3
The first and only Supreme Court case to address section 4001 (a)
was Howe v. Smith.3 °4 In this case, Vermont closed its only maximum-
security facility and contracted with the United States to house, in fed-
eral prisons, those prisoners committed to the Vermont maximum-
security prison. 30 5 Howe challenged his transfer on the ground that
the federal government lacked the authority to hold him in a federal
penitentiary.30 6 In a footnote within the majority opinion, Chief Jus-
tice Burger declared that "the plain language of § 4001 (a) pros-
crib[es] detention of any kind by the United States, absent a
congressional grant of authority to detain. '30 7 However, the Court
found that in this situation there was adequate support that Congress
had authorized such transfers. 30 8 Thus, the Supreme Court read sec-
tion 4001 (a) broadly to apply to any and all United States citizens who
were detained by the United States government, under any
circumstances.
300. Id. at 1438.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1437-38.
303. Id. at 1438.
304. 452 U.S. 473 (1981).
305. Id. at 475. Robert Howe was a Vermont prisoner charged with murder and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment and, upon conviction, he was transferred to the federal prison
system. Id. at 476.
306. Id. at 477-78.
307. Id. at 479 n.3.
308. Id. at 487.
309. Neal R. Sonnett et. al., Am. B. Ass'n, Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants,
Preliminary Report, Aug. 8, 2002, at 12, revised by Sonnett et al., supra note 275, at 5 (allowing
for concessions to be made in order to have report pass ABA House of Delegates).
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To date, there has been no Congressional authorization to allow
for the detainment of either Hamdi or Padilla.3 1 ° The Government
relies on the September 18, 2001 Joint Resolution for the Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force, which provides "the President is author-
ized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, com-
mitted, or aided the terrorist attacks .... 311 However, no language
in the statute indicates that the President can detain a United States
citizen indefinitely without charges or the right to counsel.
3 12
Additionally, a statute passed one month later, the USA Patriot
Act, indicated Congress's intent regarding detainment. 3 ' The Patriot
Act permits detention of aliens, not citizens, suspected of terrorism,
but only for a period of seven days. 314 After this time, the Govern-
ment must charge the alien with either an immigration or criminal
violation.31 5 It seems apparent that Congress would at least afford
these same protections to a United States citizen suspected of terror-
ism, if it would grant them to foreign aliens.
In response to this argument, the Padilla court stated that it
would not read the Patriot Act to explain the presidential powers
under the Joint Resolution.31 6 However, the Padilla court misinter-
preted the point of this argument. Without any clear indication from
310. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept.
18, 2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 1541 note (2001)); Sonnett et al., supra note 275, at 5-6.
311. 115 Stat. at 224.
312. See id. In addition, the Congressional Record is silent on the issue of detentions.
See S. J. Res. 23 and H. J. Res. 64. This silence is an indication that neither the House nor
the Senate contemplated the remote idea of detaining United States citizens absent consti-
tutional protections. Had members of Congress thought that the government could de-
tain American citizens as enemy combatants, it is hard to imagine that thisJoint Resolution
would have passed unanimously.
313. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001) (codified in
scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). Section 412(a) (5) states:
Commencement of Proceedings-The Attorney General shall place an alien de-
tained under paragraph (1) in removal proceedings, or shall charge the alien
with a criminal offense, not later than 7 days after the commencement of such
detention. If the requirement of the preceding sentence is not satisfied, the At-
torney General shall release the alien.
Id. at 351. Section 412(a)(6) states:
Limitation on Indefinite Detention-An alien detained solely under paragraph
(1) who has not been removed under section 241 (a) (1) (A), and whose removal is
unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, may be detained for additional peri-
ods of up to six months only if the release of the alien will threaten the national
security of the United States or the safety of the community or any person.
Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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Congress regarding detainment of United States citizens, the Patriot
Act was only being used as potential insight into Congress's intent re-
garding United States citizen detentions.' 17 Regardless, the Joint Res-
olution, which the court relied upon, does not give the President the
authority to detain a United States citizen.3" 8 Even if the Joint Resolu-
tion did give the President the authority to detain United States citi-
zens, it did not unilaterally strip citizens of all their constitutional
protections to challenge these detentions.
3. The Constitutionally Appropriate Review of an Enemy Combatant's
Detention Is Through a Habeas Corpus Petition with the Right to Counsel.-A
fundamental constitutional safeguard is the writ of habeas corpus,
which allows judicial review of the legality of a person's arrest or de-
tainment. 19 In both Hamdi and Padilla, the courts agreed that
habeas petitions were the appropriate mechanisms for the prisoners
to challenge their detentions.3 20 However, only the Padilla court ap-
propriately granted access to counsel-an obvious necessity for de-
tainees held incommunicado.3 2' Furthermore, courts can grant
detainees counsel with appropriate safeguards, such as limiting factual
presentation to information only associated with the habeas petition
or requiring heightened security clearance of counsel as recognized
in Padilla, because it will not interfere with the government's intelli-
gence gathering. It is imperative that Hamdi and Padilla have access
to counsel to prepare a habeas petition that will properly defend
against their unlawful detentions.
The habeas petition is an essential safeguard of the Constitution,
allowing for judicial review of the lawfulness of a person's arrest or
detainment. 22 The writ is the "fundamental instrument for safe-
guarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless . . . ac-
tion. '3 23 Historically, it was used to question detention without
317. Id.
318. 115 Stat. at 224.
319. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
320. Both Hamdi and Padilla have filed habeas petitions with the court, through their
father and attorney, as next friend, respectively, in order to challenge the lawfulness of
their detentions. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 450, 464-65, 472 (4th Cir. 2003); Padilla, 233 F.
Supp. 2d at 605.
321. In Hamdi III, the court inappropriately failed to discuss the issue of right to counsel
in its habeas corpus analysis, and no counsel has ever been given to Hamdi. 316 F.3d at
472-73.
322. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
323. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969).
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trial.3 2 4 Yet, the Government argued that Hamdi did not have a right
to any meaningful judicial review against the President's actIons be-
cause detaining Hamdi was solely within the President's power as
Commander-in-Chief.125 The pre-eminent role of the habeas petition,
however, is recognized in the Constitution as providing that "[t]he
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended .... 326
Therefore, the courts do have the ability to review Hamdi's and Pa-
dilla's detentions. Furthermore, the courts should review Hamdi's
and Padilla's detainment to insure that "miscarriages of justice within
its reach are surfaced and corrected. '3 27  In Harris v. Nelson, the
United States Supreme Court stated that:
There is no higher duty of a court, under our constitutional
system, than the careful processing and adjudication of peti-
tions for writs of habeas corpus, for it is in such proceedings
that a person in custody charges that error, neglect, or evil
purpose has resulted in his unlawful confinement and that
he is deprived of his freedom contrary to law.328
In addition, this judicial power of inquiry is plenary and held solely by
the judicial branch.3 2 0
Both the Fourth Circuit and the Southern District of New York
recognized that Hamdi's and Padilla's habeas petitions were the ap-
propriate mechanisms for them to challenge their detentions, 330 but
only the Padilla court ordered the essential access to counsel needed
324. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 113 (1866). The majority opinion quoted ChiefJustice
Taney in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821), where he noted that "'if a party is unlaw-
fully imprisoned, the writ of habeas corpus is his appropriate legal remedy. It is his suit in
court to recover his liberty."' Id.
325. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d 278, 282 (4th Cir. 2002). In Padilla, the Government appropri-
ately changed its position and did not dispute Padilla's right to challenge his detention
through a habeas corpus petition. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
326. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
327. Harris, 394 U.S. at 291.
328. Id. at 292.
329. Id. Thus, the Harris Court held that "[a]t any time in the [habeas corpus] proceed-
ings, when... necessary... in order that a fair and meaningful evidentiary hearing may be
held so that the court may properly 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require'...."
Id. at 300 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651); see alsoExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. 2, 110 (1866) (explain-
ing that the court can choose to waive the issuing of the writ and consider the facts of the
case to discharge the prisoner).
330. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d 450, 464-65, 472 (4th Cir. 2003); Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
In Hamdi II, the Fourth Circuit did not give the indication that habeas review should be
allowed, but finally by Hamdi III the court recognized that the writ of habeas corpus ex-
tended to Hamdi's detention. Compare Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 283-84 (stating judicial in-
quiry should not overburden "military decision-making with the panoply of encumbrances
associated with civil litigation"), and Hamdi IIl, 316 F.3d at 472 (recognizing that it is appro-
priate for a citizen to challenge unlawful detainment through a habeas petition).
[VOL-. 62:9751018
2003] U.S. CITIZENS DESIGNATED As ENEMY COMBATANTS 1019
to petition the courts effectively.33' It is impossible to expect an in-
communicado detainee to have the necessary resources and knowl-
edge to properly challenge his detention. Therefore, granting a
detainee the ability to file a habeas petition is an empty remedy with-
out the assistance of counsel.
Both Hamdi and Padilla, through next friends, petitioned the
courts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2241.32 This section grants dis-
trict courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus. 3  Section 2243
outlines the procedures to be followed in section 2241 cases, which
includes "[tihe applicant or the person detained may, under oath,
deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other mate-
rial facts. ' 334 The statute allows detainees to obtain evidence through
the use of depositions, affidavits, or interrogatories. 335 Therefore, it is
clear that Congress intended that a petitioner for habeas review under
section 2241 would be able to place facts and issues of fact before the
court.3 3 ' Even though habeas corpus statutes do not explicitly pro-
vide a right to counsel, 18 U.S.C. section 3006A(2) (B) permits a court
reviewing a habeas petition to appoint counsel for the petitioner if the
court determines that "the interests of justice so require."33 7
It is important to note that the Hamdi and Padilla courts came to
different conclusions on whether Hamdi and Padilla should have the
right to counsel.33 8 In Hamdi II, the Fourth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's order granting Hamdi unmonitored access to counsel.33 9
In Hamdi III, the Fourth Circuit specifically refused to address the is-
sue of counsel and by doing so, effectively excluded Hamdi from ever
meeting with counsel to obtain the necessary evidence to challenge
his detention or to even tell his side of the story.340 Therefore, the
Fourth Circuit frustrated the purpose of the habeas corpus proce-
dures that Congress established when the court denied Hamdi, a pris-
331. Even though Padilla has been granted access to counsel, he has never met with
counsel to assist in his habeas petition because the order has been appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Paula Span, Enemy Combatant Vanishes Into a
"Legal Black Hole, "WASH. POST, July 30, 2003, at Al.
332. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000).
333. Hamdi I1, 316 F.3d at 459; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 571-72.
334. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2000).
335. Id. In addition, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules Governing
section 2254 cases may be applied in section 2241 habeas corpus cases, in the discretion of
the court. FED. R. Civ. P. 81 (a)(2).
336. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000).
337. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(2) (B).
338. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2002); Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
339. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 284.
340. Hamdi II, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003).
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oner held incommunicado, the use and guidance of an attorney to
present facts to the court.341
In stark contrast, the Southern District of New York recognized
that Padilla's need for counsel was "obvious" in order to present and
contest facts of his detention, especially because the government was
holding him incommunicado.342 The court recognized that the
habeas corpus statute gives courts the flexibility to grant habeas peti-
tioners the assistance of counsel. 43 The court also noted that peti-
tioners usually file writs of habeas review on appeal from a trial
proceeding in which the petitioner had been represented by coun-
sel.34 4 Padilla, who had not been tried or even charged, had no such
benefit of counsel at all in his case and, thus, counsel was essential for
him to challenge his detention.345 The court concluded that assis-
tance of counsel was the only practical means for Padilla to challenge
his detention.3 46 Therefore, habeas relief without counsel was an
empty remedy. 47 The Padilla court recognized this problem and or-
dered Padilla the right of counsel to assist him in arguing his habeas
petition. 48
The government's concerns that access to counsel mightjeopard-
ize intelligence gathering and the potential for message passing
through attorneys to members of al Qaeda do not justify denial of
access to counsel.349 As stated in Padilla, access to counsel in these
types of proceedings can be limited to presenting facts to the court in
connection with the habeas petition .35 A general right of counsel to
advise the detainee how to answer questions from the government is
unnecessary, and any governmental interrogations therefore would
not be hindered.3 5' Courts could require lawyers representing detain-
ees to submit to security clearance and background checks to ensure
that they provide effective representation without threatening the na-
tion's security.3 5 2 The Padilla court appropriately determined that the
341. See Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 284.
342. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 602.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. See supra notes 222-243 and accompanying text (discussing the Government's inter-
est in not granting access to counsel); see also Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 603-04.
350. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 603-04.
351. Id.
352. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 604 (discussing procedures used by the United States
Bureau of Prisons for dangerous prisoners).
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government's concerns about granting enemy combatants access to
counsel did not outweigh the detainee's liberty interest in pursuing
his habeas petition with the effective assistance from an attorney. 3
Therefore, future courts should follow the rationale from the Padilla
court and allow limited access to counsel for United States citizens
held as enemy combatants to challenge their detentions through
habeas petitions.35 4
4. Military Tribunals-An Alternate, Yet Undesirable Avenue of Pro-
cess for United States Citizens Designated as Enemy Combatants.-There are
only two potential ways to try United States citizens labeled "enemy
combatants"-through Article III courts or by military commis-
sions. 355 However, being tried before a military tribunal is not an op-
tion for Hamdi, Padilla, or any other United States citizen captured in
response to terrorism, because the President's November 13, 2001
military order (Order) specifically limits military commissions to non-
United States citizens. 56 On November 13, 2001, the President exe-
cuted a military order to commission the use of military tribunals in
the war against terrorism.357 However, the Order specifically limited
the individuals that could be prosecuted in military commissions to
non-United States citizens that are members of al Qaeda or non-
United States citizens that have engaged in or assisted in acts of terror-
ism against the United States.3 5 ' Therefore, the President's Order ef-
fectively limited the Supreme Court's decision in Quiin that a United
States citizen labeled an enemy combatant could be tried before a
military tribunal.3 5 9 Furthermore, these established military commis-
sions grant detained individuals the right to defense counsel through
the judge advocate and allow individuals the ability to retain civilian
defense counsel.360 Thus, it seems apparent that a United States citi-
353. Id. at 605.
354. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d 278, 282-84 (4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi 11, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th
Cir. 2003). In light of Hamdi III, the Government filed a motion to reconsider the South-
ern District of New York's order granting Padilla access to counsel to challenge his deten-
tion as an enemy combatant. Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Asks Judge to Deny Terror Suspect Access to
Lawyer, Saying It Could Harm Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at All.
355. ExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123 (1866); ExparteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 44 (1942).
356. Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 57833-34 (Nov. 16, 2001)
("President's Military Order").
357. Id. at 57834-35.
358. Id. at 57834.
359. Quiin, 317 U.S. at 37-38, 44.
360. Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, Procedures for Trials by
Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
Mar. 21, 2002, at 4.
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zen detained by the Department of Defense should be afforded the
same minimal protections that non-United States citizens accused of
terrorist activities receive. Because military commissions are not avail-
able for United States citizens labeled enemy combatants, the only
and preferred option available to these United States citizens is Article
III courts. Even if military commissions were available, they are still
inferior to Article III courts. As United States citizens, Hamdi and
Padilla deserve the full panoply of protections afforded under the
Constitution inherent in Article III courts.
5. Article III Courts and Due Process Protections-The Proper Constitu-
tional Protections for United States Citizens Against Unbridled Executive Ac-
tions.-In times of war or national emergency, it is important for the
executive branch to act with one voice in matters of foreign policy,
national security, and military affairs. 61 In fact, in our tripartite gov-
ernment, deference is given to the President in matters of national
emergency and security, but unchecked power is not allowed.362
Therefore, the judicial branch, through Article III courts, must be
available to guard against executive actions that infringe on the consti-
tutional rights of United States citizens.163 The purpose of the judici-
ary is to articulate the law and demand that the executive branch
explain and defend its actions.3 64 However, the Government argues
that no meaningful judicial review is allowed for United States citizens
designated as enemy combatants. 3 65 Therefore, the executive branch
is operating outside the rule of law by asserting unreviewable power
and asking that the other branches not question its judgment.3 66 But
checks and balances are an essential element of our government, par-
ticularly in times of crisis, and the courts are properly equipped to
handle these issues.367
361. See Hamdi III, 316 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing judicial deference to
the Executive's war powers); Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 589-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(describing the importance of the Executive's powers during times of war).
362. Hamdi Ill, 315 F.3d at 464.
363. In Duncan v. Kahanamoku, the Court stated that our founders were "opposed to
governments that placed in the hands of one man the power to make, interpret and en-
force the laws." 327 U.S. 304, 322 (1946) (relying on Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)).
The established principle of "every free people is, that the law shall alone govern; and to it
the military must always yield." Id. at 323.
364. Anne Gearan, Bush's War on Terror Runs Afoul of the Rule of Law: Despite Popular
Support, It Has Suffered Mostly Defeat in Court, SEATrLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 28, 2002, at
B7.
365. Hamdi I1, 296 F.3d 278, 282 (4th Cir. 2002).
366. Homeland Security: Speakers Criticize Government's Position on Detaining Citi-
zens as Enemy Combatants, 71 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 604, 605 (Aug. 21, 2002).
367. Id.
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The rule of law has been tested many times throughout our his-
tory, but the courts have properly risen to the occasion to protect the
Constitution. In Milligan, the Supreme Court declared that due pro-
cess safeguards must be protected and ensured in the midst of a na-
tional emergency. 368 The Court held that a United States citizen
arrested during the Civil War for aiding the enemy had a right to be
tried in civilian courts with all of the constitutional protections, so
long as those courts were open and functioning.36 9 The Milligan
Court's guidance is applicable to the Hamdi and Padilla cases. The
Court stated that:
[t]he history of the world .. . taught [our founders] that
what was done in the past might be attempted in the future.
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rule and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the
shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and
under all circumstances . .. [F]or the government, within
the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are
necessary to preserve its existence. . .."0
At the most basic level of constitutional protections, is the notion
that the government cannot detain someone accused of wrongdoing
without the traditional elements of accusation, trial, conviction, and
punishment.37 1 In Milligan, the Court held that due process even ap-
plies in times of war and "it is the birthright of every American citizen
when charged with crime, to be tried and punished according to the
law."' 3 7 2
368. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120-21 (1866).
369. Id. at 123.
370. Id. at 120-21. The Government tried to distinguish Hamdi's case from Milligan by
labeling Hamdi an enemy combatant. See Hamdi II, 296 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2002)
(determining that Hamdi should be labeled an enemy combatant). Therefore, the govern-
ment is not treating Hamdi as a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention or trying
him before a military commission. Id. at 282. In essence the government is taking an
unprecedented step by labeling Hamdi an enemy combatant and detaining him indefi-
nitely without any opportunity to rebut such detainment. See id.
371. Brief Submitted on Behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union, New York Civil
Liberties Union and Center for National Security Studies as Amici Curiae forJose Padilla, at
5, Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02 Civ. 4445 (MBM)) (Sept.
26, 2002).
372. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 119. The Government contends that Hamdi and Padilla have
not been charged with a crime and, thus, their Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not
attach. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.a. However, the Government has disingenuously
and purposefully not brought charges against Hamdi and Padilla in order to circumscribe
the array of constitutional protections afforded to persons accused of criminal behavior.
Therefore, it is even more essential that Hamdi and Padilla, as United States citizens be
protected by the Constitution's full reach.
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The Fifth Amendment guarantees apply to those accused of war
crimes and to those who possess enemy belligerent status. 73 Any ex-
ception to this rule would be contrary to the Constitution and to think
otherwise would be to admit that the enemy has lost the battle but has
destroyed our ideals.3 74 Hamdi and Padilla are currently being physi-
cally restrained by military force in the United States. 5 Their liberty
has been taken away and the Constitution requires that they be given
due process of the law. At a minimum, this means notice and the
opportunity to be heard, but the Fourth Circuit and Southern District
of New York failed to acknowledge these requirements.3 7 6
Article III courts are the proper forum to prosecute United States
citizens labeled enemy combatants as shown through the courts' past
prosecutions of other terrorists. For example, the individuals accused
of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing were properly tried and
convicted and sentenced to 240 years in prison and fined $250,000 in
the Southern District of New York.377 In October 2001, a court sen-
tenced four of Osama bin Laden's associates to two life terms of im-
prisonment and ordered them to pay $33 million to individual victims
and our government for the 1998 bombing of United States embassies
in Nairobi, Kenya.378 In addition, most recently, John Walker Lindh
pled guilty to supplying services to the Taliban and carrying an explo-
sive during the commission of a felony.379 He was sentenced to twenty
years in prison. 8 ° Lindh's case is compelling evidence that the rule of
law does successfully prosecute and punish United States citizens who
take up arms against the United States. 81
373. In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 26 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
374. Id. at 26, 29.
375. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 280; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 569.
376. See Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 282-84; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 559-602. Furthermore,
in Ex pane Milligan, the Court noted that all Constitutional protections should be granted,
especially those provided by the Fourth (protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures), Fifth (provides for grand jury indictments, no double jeopardy, and due process
of law, and just compensation) and Sixth (rights of the accused to speedy and public trial,
to confront witnesses, and to have the assistance of counsel or defense). Milligan, 71 U.S.
at 119.
377. United States v. Salameh, 1993 WL 364486 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 152 F.3d 88 (2d
Cir. 1998). Arthur C. Helton, Where Should Alleged Terrorists Be Prosecuted?: Pro Civilian
Courts, INSIGHTS ON L. & Soc'y, Spring/Summer 2002, at 15. Ironically, Padilla was heard
in the Southern District of New York-the same court that properly handled the 1993
World Trade Center terrorists.
378. Id.
379. United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 569-70 (E.D. Va. 2002).
380. Id. at 572.
381. See id.
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The facts of Hamdi's and Lindh's cases are almost identical, yet
the Government considers Hamdi an enemy combatant and is not giv-
ing him any of the protections afforded to Lindh. Both Hamdi and
Lindh are United States citizens and both were fighting on behalf of
al Qaeda and the Taliban.3 s2 Both were also found on the battlefield
in Afghanistan taking up arms against the United States. 8 3 And, both
were captured by Northern Alliance and American forces in Novem-
ber/December 2001.384 However, the Government immediately rec-
ognized Lindh as a United States national and, after interrogating
him, transported him to the United States and indicted him in federal
court.38 5 In contrast, the Government did not acknowledge Hamdi's
citizenship status until he was transported to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
in April 2002.386 He was then transported to Norfolk, Virginia and
designated an enemy combatant.3" 7 It is noteworthy that both of
these United States citizens are being treated so inconsistently by the
Government. Lindh received access to the courts with assistance of
counsel and Hamdi cannot even meet with counsel to challenge his
unlawful detention. It is evident from the Lindh case that Article III
courts can properly prosecute and punish "enemy combatants." The
courts are the proper mechanism to check the President's actions
without undermining the national security goals and more impor-
tantly, without undermining a United States citizen's constitutional
protections.
Our country is faced with a war on terror that has no boundaries
or limitations, but we must not let our passions of the moment destroy
the constitutional foundation upon which we stand. Hamdi and Pa-
dilla are United States citizens and deserve the constitutional protec-
tions that attach. The Fourth Circuit should have recognized Hamdi's
inherent constitutional protections and allowed him to meet with
counsel to challenge his detention. The court was wrong to look the
other way and allow the executive branch to continue its unlawful de-
tention of a United States citizen. Both courts failed the American
382. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 2003); Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 567-68.
383. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 460; Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 568-70. Padilla's case is even
more compelling than Hamdi's or Lindh's because he was arrested on United States soil.
Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568 (2002). Yet Lindh who was fighting in Afghani-
stan has been given access to the courts and Padilla has not. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
384. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 460; Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 569.
385. Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Nationals Detained as Unlawful Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT'L L.
981, 981 (2002).
386. Id.
387. Id.
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public by not protecting the rights of United States citizens.38 8 In
Yamashita, Justice Murphy cautioned that
[a] t a time like [war] when emotions are understandably
high it is difficult to adopt a dispassionate attitude toward a
case of this nature. Yet now is precisely the time when that
attitude is most essential. While peoples in other lands may
not share our beliefs as to due process and the dignity of the
individual, we are not free to give effect to our emotions in
reckless disregard of the rights of others. We live under the
Constitution, which is the embodiment of all the high hopes
and aspirations of the new world. And it is applicable in
both war and peace.389
Our government has gone astray in its designation and detention of
United States citizens labeled enemy combatants and the courts in
Hamdi and Padilla have justified these outrageous actions. Article III
courts, as seen in Lindh, are the proper fora to prosecute and punish
terrorists. It is essential that Hamdi, Padilla, and all United States citi-
zens, be afforded access to these courts and their constitutional rights
upheld.
III. CONCLUSION
The events of September 11, 2001 will remain a vivid reminder of
our nation's vulnerabilities; however, they will also forever serve to
demonstrate our strength and resilience. As citizens, we demand that
the government take strong action against those responsible for the
attacks on our nation, and we expect the government to protect us
from future attacks. On one side of this debate is the notion that
enemy combatants, regardless of citizenship, do not have a right to
counsel, let alone unmonitored access to counsel, because they have
not been charged with a crime. Enemy combatants are merely being
held for intelligence gathering purposes and to prevent them from
engaging in further warfare against the United States. Because there
are sufficient safeguards in place to prevent injustice, the government
is properly detaining these enemy combatants.
On the other side of the debate is the fact that these persons who
have been labeled enemy combatants are United States citizens who
should be afforded all the protections of the Constitution. This view
does not undermine the importance of the President's responsibility
388. Even though the Padilla court gave Padilla access to counsel, the court's "some
evidence" standard of review is so low that in effect it is a meaningless review of the execu-
tive's enemy combatant designation. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 605-08.
389. In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1946).
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to protect all citizens, but in our system of checks and balances, the
President does not have unfettered discretion to label and detain
United States citizens as enemy combatants without procedural pro-
tections. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the Article III courts to
check the power of the President and ensure that individual rights are
protected and not sacrificed in the war on terror.
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